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It was Melanie Klein who emphasized the importance of fantasies and playing in the process of development. In her Psychoanalysis of Children Klein brought to light that as humans we perpetually oscillate between paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position throughout life. Klein categorized the death drive as more dominant in the paranoid-schizoid position and life-drive as more dominant in the depressive position. For Klein a successful therapeutic procedure would result in maintaining a contact with the intermediary realm between phantasm and reality. Klein’s importance lies in her acceptance and affirmation of our most primitive drives’ role throughout life. The need for satisfaction of those drives sometimes reaches to such inordinate measures that we become aggressive in the face of reality. Frustrations arise and things get worse, for we don’t know how to turn our frustrations into fuel for the life drive, and eventually fall victim to the death drive in search of omnipotence.[1]

According to Freud, as he puts it in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, drives were governed by the pleasure principle and the object of satisfaction of these drives was not very important. In other words, between the drive and its objects there was no natural tie.[2] But for Klein, who prefers the word instinct instead of drive, from the beginning of life onwards instincts are connected to certain internal objects. From the beginning of life the human subject is in pursuit of object relations in the way of satisfying the instincts such as hunger and thirst.[3]

Klein’s shifting conceptualisation of the process of subject formation can be clearly observed in her analysis of the relationship between “The Early Stages of the Oedipus-Conflict and Super-Ego Formation.” Klein takes the beginning of socialization to a pre-Oedipal stage, a pre-verbal if not pre-linguistic stage, to the first year of life. When a baby is born it immediately is in the world of objects. And language, being the extension of the world, that is, being one of the objects surrounding the subject, is immediately at the disposal of the subject just like any other object. We must keep in mind, however, that from language Klein understands not only the words but also the objects such as a toy soldier, or a ball, or any other object. Now, the baby as the subject throws its toy soldier at the mother to get her attention, or to articulate that it is hungry. This action of the baby is similar to someone sending a letter to his/her lover to articulate that he/she has missed him/her and wants to have sex soon. It is in this larger context that we understand language not only as words but also as everything that is at hand.[4]

According to Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and Lacan, the formation of the subject begins with the appearance of the Name of the Father and his law prohibiting incest. It is only with the father saying, “No, you shall not desire the mother, but try to be the object of mother’s desire,” that the child experiences his first confrontation with the symbolic order. But in Klein this process is related to the development of object relations in a time where there is imaginary meaning and not symbolic meaning.

            Klein attributes great significance to the unconscious phantasmatic workings of the mind. The unconscious which for Freud and to some extent Lacan is a static state of being becomes the site of a continuity in dynamism and the time of a perpetual phantasmatic production. For Klein, the object of psychoanalysis may be the Unconscious, but the object of psychotherapy is this unconscious process of phantasm production. Klein’s therapeutic technique involves bringing the patient face to face with the Real of his/her desire. In this process very primitive and archaic aspects of the human subject are put into the spotlight.    

Early analysis offers one of the most fruitful fields for psychoanalytic therapy precisely because the child has the ability to represent its unconscious in a direct way, and is thus not only able to experience a far-reaching emotional abreaction but actually to live through the original situation in its analysis, so that with the help of interpretation its fixations can to a considerable extent be resolved.[5]

When a child creates imaginary characters, pretends that they are real and talks with them, this is considered as playing, but when an adult does the same thing he is considered to be a schizophrenic, a subject of psychosis. Schizophrenia is a term coined by Bleuler to designate a set of symptoms such as loss of memory and excessively regressive behaviour usually associated with old age. The schizophrenic experience, as understood by Bleuler, is the reliving of childhood near death in the form of a disorganizaton and loss of the pieces constituting the memory.

[…] by projecting his terrifying super-ego on to his objects, the individual increases his hatred of those objects and thus also his fear of them, with the result that, if his aggression and anxiety are excessive, his external world is changed into a place of terror and his objects into enemies and he is threatened with persecution both from the external world and from his introjected enemies.[6]

Klein describes schizophrenia as the “attempt to ward off, master or contend with an internal enemy.”[7] This theme is linked to Klein’s discussion about the dynamic of envy. For Klein, the child, not yet capable of making a distinction between what is inner and what is outer, attacks the source of possible gratification. Envy is a product of a fantasy that the breast is good all the time because it supplies the child with milk whenever he wants. When the milk is denied to the child the child believes that the mother is bad because she is withholding the source of good. The child splits the object into good and bad to save the good breast from possible damage caused by his attacks on the bad breast. Klein goes on to say that it is at this stage that the child develops a sense of external reality by beginning to see the mother as another person, and the breast as a whole object which is good and bad at the same time. This is the depressive position in which the same object has conflicting significations for the child. Understanding that he has been attacking not only the bad breast but also the source of good induces guilt in the child who in turn learns why not to be envious. Klein sees guilt as therapeutic of envy. What appears to be the illness turns out to be the source of good in Klein’s therapeutic procedure. With Klein therapy is reaffirmed as the process of reconciliation through which a rational subject is created.


[1]Melanie Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, trans. Alix Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1975)

[2] Sigmund Freud, Three Essays On The Theory Of Sexuality, trans. Strachey J. (London: Hogarth Press, 1964)

[3] Melanie Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1984)

[4] Melanie Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, trans. Alix Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1975)

[5] Melanie Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, trans. Alix Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1975),9

[6] Klein, 143-4

[7] Klein, 144

Descartes

Life and Death in a Raving New World (excerpt from The Life Death Drives)

The influence of Nietzsche’s concepts of the will to nothingness and eternal return are pervasive in Freud’s later work. Freud’s turn towards metapsychology and his consequent creation of the concept of the death drive is rooted in his need for something to fill in the gaps in his scientific and empirically observable theories owing much to Darwin. Freud was uneasy with the concept of the death drive on account of its non-scientific nature, but nevertheless he had to conceptualize the death drive as the counterpart of the life drive in order to be able to go beyond the pleasure principle. Educated as a neuroscientist Freud was aware that he was contradicting himself and perhaps even turning against his earlier attitude towards the human psyche by showing that at the beginning was the death drive and that the life drive was only an outcome, a kind of defense against the death drive… Read More

via senselogic

Being Without Thought: The Unconscious and the Critique of Correlationism

Being Without Thought: The Unconscious and the Critique of Correlationism I have decided to make available a short draft version of a larger work, what could probably be called my greater “project” that I am actively working on. As has been pointed out by both Nick and Ben in their recent interviews with Paul Ennis, I am part of a small group of speculative realists (a name I gladly wear) that not only defends, but attempts to expand on the tradition of psychoanalysis, or more specifically, the metaphysics of psychoanalysis… Read More

via Complete Lies.

1. Freud and Einstein

In 1931 the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation invited certain intellectuals to communicate and think about the solutions to the problems facing the world. The First World War was over but the second one was already knocking on the door. The developments in central Europe were signs of the approaching disaster. Einstein was one of the intellectuals the institute got in touch with, and he proposed Freud as a participant in this collaboration. In 1932 Einstein wrote a letter to Freud and asked him how the tendency of humanity to war, destruction and violence could be overcome, if it could be overcome. Einstein expected Freud to come up with some practical solutions. Einstein wanted revolution, but a great admirer of Darwin, Freud talked about evolution.

Freud responded to Einstein after about a month. Throughout the letter Freud emphasized that he couldn’t do what Einstein expected him to, that it was impossible for him to come up with practical solutions to the problem of aggression inherent in human nature.

In his response to Einstein’s letter Freud interrogated the relation between the aggressive impulse in human nature and the organization of society and concluded that in the organization of social order aggression was unavoidable.

In the second part of his letter Freud mentioned the role played by drives in the inner world of human-beings and summarized his theory of drives. According to Freud the polarity between the forces of attraction and repulsion, which Einstein was familiar with as a physicist, also existed in human psyche. One of these forces was the life drive which aimed at self-preservation and unification, the erotic force represented by Eros. The other force was the death drive which aimed at destruction and splitting, represented by Thanatos.

But we must not be too hasty in introducing ethical judgements of good and evil. Neither of these instincts is any less essential than the other; the phenomena of life arise from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of both. Now it seems as though an instinct of the one sort can scarcely ever operate in isolation; it is always accompanied—or, as we say, alloyed – with a certain quota from the other side, which modifies its aim or is, in some cases, what enables it to achieve that aim. Thus, for instance, the instinct of self-preservation is certainly of an erotic kind, but it must nevertheless have aggressiveness at its disposal if it is to fulfil its purpose. So, too, the instinct of love, when it is directed towards an object, stands in need of some contribution from the instinct for mastery if it is in any way to obtain possession of that object. The difficulty of isolating the two classes of instinct in their actual manifestation is indeed what has so long prevented us from recognizing them.[1]

For Freud the death drive was targeting the living organism, aiming at turning the organic into inorganic. Because of the intervention of the self-preservative force of the life drive, the death drive was turned towards the external world by a psychic operation, so that the self-destruction of the organism was prevented.

It is important to note here that death drive does not correspond to self-destruction. The death drive postpones the self-destruction of the organism by projecting aggression onto the external world and hence can be said to serve self-preservation. The self-destructive impulse turns against itself and manifests itself as violence and aggression against the others. The subject kills the others not to kill itself. “The death instinct turns into the destructive instinct when, with the help of special organs, it is directed outwards, on to objects. The organism preserves its own life, so to say, by destroying an extraneous one.”[2] It is this scenario that makes it possible to say that there is a disjunctive synthesis at work here. A term coined by Gilles Deleuze, disjunctive synthesis defines the operation in and through which the two components of an apparatus, a psychic apparatus in this case, appear to be the two differently conceived constituents of the same thing.  

The influence of Nietzsche’s concepts of the will to nothingness and eternal return are pervasive in Freud’s later work. Freud’s turn towards metapsychology and his consequent creation of the concept of the death drive is rooted in his need for something to fill in the gaps in his scientific and empirically observable theories owing much to Darwin. Freud was uneasy with the concept of the death drive on account of its non-scientific nature, but nevertheless he had to conceptualize the death drive as the counterpart of the life drive in order to be able to go beyond the pleasure principle. Educated as a neuroscientist Freud was aware that he was contradicting himself and perhaps even turning against his earlier attitude towards the human psyche by showing that at the beginning was the death drive and that the life drive was only an outcome, a kind of defense against the death drive.

In his Civilization and Its Discontents Freud talked about the oceanic feeling, a sense of oneness with the world which he admits to have never experienced personally. Perhaps his creation of the highly speculative concept of the death drive was Freud’s attempt to fill the gap opened by the absence of this oceanic feeling for him.  

Writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person; and the dwelling-house was a substitute for the mother’s womb, the first lodging, for which in all likelihood man still longs, and in which he was safe and felt at ease.[3]

In his An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud had put forward the idea that drives produce affects and so drives are at the root of all actions. I agree with Freud that drives are at the root of all actions at the beginning, but contrary to what Freud says of them, I think affects are not mere manifestations of the drives. Rather, affects emerge as a response to the changes in the level of the intensity of external stimuli. The external stimuli creates affects towards objects and the drives “find” their satisfaction through the affective quality of the objects produced to match the drive. But it is precisely this matching process that produces the desire for the object, so the unconscious drive turns into “conscious” desire. 

In his 1920 essay Beyond The Pleasure Principle, Freud revised his drive theory and introduced his concept of the death drive. In this revised drive theory Freud conceptualized the life drive as inclusive of both the libidinal impulses and the self-preservative impulses. As for the death drive Freud conceptualized it as the self-destructive impulse. So, at the beginning Freud argued that libidinal impulses contain sadistic elements as well. While in his first drive theory in On Narcissism (1914), Freud suggested that aggression should be included within the life drive, in his second drive theory in Beyond The Pleasure Principle, he says that aggression is the will to return to the inorganic state and is therefore directed against the self and serves self-destruction. According to this picture if adaptation is essential to survival then aggression is against life and is a manifestation of the death drive.

In the face of the present situation I project a few alterations onto Freud’s drive theory in the light of Lacan’s theory of the subject. Since thought is a product of the brain and since most psychoanalysts agree that metaphysical phenomena are composed of psychosomatic events, there is nothing other than a fantasy that fills the space between the soma and the psyche. This fantasy (‘I,) stands in for the nothingness in between them; it unites them as it splits them apart. I disagree with Freud’s theory concerning the source of drives. But I do make a distinction between the conscious desires and the unconscious drives. 

Lacan’s contribution to the field is his realization that the unconscious drives are shaped by the external circumstances and turned into conscious desire. For me Lacan’s theory, however, just like Hobbes’s metaphor of modern power, the Leviathan, remains, to use Donald Winnicott’s terms, a mere transitional object, which helps to situate the psychosomatic events in the context of sociopolitical theory.

I now return to Hobbes through Foucault, whose thoughts on death and its relation to power become relevant to the subject of drives, their source, and their processes of formation.

2. The Void, Drives, Automata 

The most important thing that Hobbes says in Leviathan, which I think is still relevant to a considerable extent, is that death is the absolute master, and the fear of death forces the subjects to adapt to the existing social order. Leviathan feeds on this fear of death, and it is Leviathan itself that instills the fear of death in people. If we keep in mind that in Western societies death is associated with nothing/ness, it becomes clearer why and how Foucault’s use of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon in Discipline and Punish as a metaphor of the modern power structure which has nothing/ness at its centre gains new significance.     

At the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with white windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions – to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide – it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. Full lightning and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap.[4]  

            Foucault, without directly referring to him, shows that Hobbes’s monster has become a machine. I argue that this machine is itself in a process of transformation today, and is in the way of taking the form of something that is neither organic nor inorganic, neither visible nor invisible, but felt. This is power as affective force. Power can no more be represented by metaphors. For metaphor is a concept that belongs to the world of metaphysics which exists only as a fantasy world, whereas today power has a more material existence than it has ever had and its materiality splits as it unites the psychosomatic and the sociopolitical realms of experience.

The automatization of power, that is, transformation of power from an organic state, as demonstrated by Hobbes, towards an inorganic state, as demonstrated by Foucault, has been studied in a different way and in a different context by Mark Poster in his Foucault, Marxism, and History. Influenced by Poster’s interpretation of Foucault in relation to Marxism, and in the context of the relationship between discourse and power, I reassert, in a different way and for different reasons, that Foucault’s conceptualization of the Panopticon is useful and yet insufficient in understanding the workings of power today in the face of the recent developments in technology.

In this new situation the subjects know that they are still locked in the Panopticon, but pretend that they are free floating across the Superpanopticon.  This is because they are being locked deeper into the Panopticon; and there finding themselves dismembered, losing themselves in the terrible condition of being pushed further into the hitherto undiscovered corners of one’s own room, in their cells.

A new formulation of Foucault’s concept of bio-power, the Superpanoptic discourse reverses the roles of Eros and Thanatos; abuses our understandings and misunderstandings of the life drive and the death drive, as well as manipulating our inner conflicts and turning us into antagonists. It does this by erasing the necessary boundary between life and death, the organic and the inorganic, so as to create the conditions of possibility for manufacturing an illusory sense of oneness with the world, hence uniting the subject of statement (the enunciated) and the subject of enunciation which should remain separate from and/but contiguous to one another for the perpetual transformation and multiplication of life forms to take place at the same time.

Now I will attempt to make a leap forward in the direction of theorizing a practical way of handling the conflict between material production and metaphysical production. In what follows, therefore, I try to show how this conflict arises and how it turns into an antagonism.

It is the projection-introjection mechanism operating within and through the capillaries of the body without organs across the new Earth only to reproduce that which it had attempted to expulse as an organ without a body on the old Earth that produces the two poles of the unhealthy conflict. One being social and the other metaphysical, and being against one another, these two are feeding neither themselves nor the other, but contributing to the production of otherness as negativity, hence taking part in the setting of the very vicious trap in which they find themselves against each other and out of which they both come dismembered. They are locked in an agonizing process, which is destroying both of them. It is impossible for one to survive without the other, and yet they prefer to eat one another. Social production produces exclusion of the other, metaphysical production produces an illusory image of the other. When these two modes of production work together they create the conditions of impossibility for a non-illusory and non-antagonistic mode of being.

We shall add to this, that although the problem is inherent in the projection-introjection mechanism itself we are looking for the source of our maladies outside. We are projecting all our bad qualities onto the others and then accusing them of being negative towards us. In turn we are giving birth to the negativity of the other, or otherness as negativity. The negative within and without us is being created by us since we introject what we have projected and inversely.

 

3. The Subject and Power

The relationship between the subject and power is a theme that has played a significant role in determining the direction of European thought since Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. Both the Frankfurt School thinkers such as Horkheimer and Adorno, and the poststructuralists such as Deleuze and Foucault, took on this subject as one of the objects of their studies in different ways. Although I was deeply influenced by Adorno’s Negative Dialectics and Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution before the beginning of this thesis, I later on turned towards Deleuze and Foucault to find tools for repairing the restrictive implications of the early Frankfurt School thought. I think post-structuralism and critical theory have a lot more to offer to one another that can be used in practical critique of the predominant order in particular and nihilisms in general, than many, such as Habermas, suggest.

Having taken what I wanted from both parties, I asymmetrically placed them into one another’s contexts with the aim of analyzing the relationship not only between post-structuralism and critical theory, but also between theory and practice. I projected these two forms of thought onto one another. My aim was to theorize a practical way of looking at the world which could be turned into action in accordance with the demands of the present. I used practical Kleinian looking glasses and what I saw was and remains uncanny. I found Thomas Hobbes and Michel Foucault in the form of a snake biting its own tail in a cell, with Marcuse standing firm outside the cell as the guardian angel under the guiding hand of Reich and his orgasm theory.  Upon the emergence of this image that in time took shape on the stage of my internal theatre, I finally managed to determine my direction and object of study.

The point of departure of this thesis is the modern discourse on power that emerged with the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. A response to metaphysics and Christian dogmatism, Enlightenment is a system of thought which proclaims itself to be governed by universal reason alone. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno situate Marx and Freud, together with themselves, in this tradition. I situate Foucault himself in this same tradition of Enlightenment.

Michel Foucault’s interpretation of the Panopticon, and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan become relevant here precisely because they present us with metaphors representing an idealized model of modern power structure which takes its driving force from the exploitation of the conflict between the psyche and the soma, reason and non-reason, the life drive and the death drive.

This power structure is not only still dominant, but also increasing its dominance as it decreases its visibility.  It does this by making the subjects believe that they are governed by the reality principle when in fact they are governed by the pleasure principle. This situation causes a shift in the subject’s conception of health. I’ll come back to this in the future, but now I have to mention something else which is very closely linked to this shift in the subject’s conception of health.

Enlightenment signifies the secularization of the authority of the Big Other, and erection of instrumental reason in the place of the absolute authority of the Bible. In this light Enlightenment appears to be merely a change of roles between the masters and the slaves; the problem inherent in the metaphysical world of representation remains the same. Walter Benjamin, for instance, warns against this trap set by the panoptic mechanism which creates a Leviathan within the subject. In his essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Benjamin argues that cinema can turn out to be a fascist propaganda machine if it falls in the wrong hands. Benjamin is not only against the aestheticization of politics but also the politicization of aesthetics. What remains unthought in Benjamin’s essay, though, is the ideology of representational and metaphysical conceptions of non-reason, which is itself the problem inherent in the structure of the system.

Here it is also important to emphasize my difference from Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse considered modern western capitalist societies to be sick. He thought himself as the healthy subject outside a sick society and determined his goal as the healing of this sick society. Marcuse’s political philosophy as therapy is no more sufficient for the increasingly sophisticated problems of today. For power has become more than oppressive/repressive.

4. The Imprisoned Creators of Our Times

If we look at the contemporary electronic music scene we see that the three dimensional sounds created are non-representational to such an extent that it is as though there is a living organism from a completely another dimension making organic noises in the room. I will return to the relevance of electronic music in a little while, but first let me revisit Herbert Marcuse’s theory of how capitalism keeps itself alive by feeding on the death of the counter-subjectivities and the life of the dominant consuming subject governed by the life drive which is itself externally constituted within the subject.

In a nutshell, Marcuse’s theory in One-Dimensional Man was that the one dimensional market society absorbs and turns the counter-cultural products into its own agents, reducing the two-dimensional to the one-dimensional, hence making the forces of resistance serve the purpose of strengthening what they are counter to. Marcuse’s problem was the dissolution of the two-dimensional sphere of counter-cultural production and its domination by the one-dimensional relations. He suggested using mythological imagery  not only to make sense of the pre-dominant social reality, but also to create a counter-social reality which would at the same time be a critique of the existing social reality. What Marcuse said is still relevant to a certain extent, but to be able to use this theory one has to adapt it to the demands of the present situation. What I will attempt to do, therefore, is to ignore the irrelevant parts of Marcuse’s theory and try to find out those parts of it that matter for my concerns. It is true that Marcuse’s theory is no more sufficient in understanding and solving the problems of our Superpanoptic societies. And yet in it there are lots of insights with high potential for development in the service of psychosomatic and sociopolitical progress today.

Today even Madonna’s latest release, Confessions on the Dance Floor, is produced in a DJ’s room in London. The electronic dance music products are mostly produced in people’s bedrooms on a personal computer donated with software especially produced for making electronic music. The recent shift in the gears of electronic dance music, of course, is a cause of the amazing possibilities the digital sound machines present. These machines have no material existence; they are loaded on the computer in the form of digital data. One can have a studio loaded into one’s computer by pressing a few buttons on the keyboard. In this context, making music requires technical knowledge of the tools of production more than the knowledge of the rules of what is called making music. With electronic music the sounds are already there, loaded into the computer; all one needs to do to become a music producer has become putting these sounds together, making them overlap with one another in a positively disordered way and produce something that is neither the one nor the other.

If we imagine for a moment Beethoven making his music after the orchestra plays it, composing the piece after it is materialized, we can see how paradoxical the situation the producer is caught up in inherent in the production process of electronic music is. It is as if Beethoven wrote the notes of his music as he listened to the orchestra play it. We can see that this is in fact exactly the opposite of what Beethoven did. For in the case of Beethoven, unlike the electronic music producer, it is the internal orchestra in the psyche that plays the piece as Beethoven writes it, not an actual orchestra in its material existence. With electronic music that internal orchestra is not in the creator’s mind, but in the computer. 

Some of the more creative and experimentalist logics in this field record the noises coming from within their bodies, or from within other animals’ bodies, load them into the computer, and with the aid of synthesizers and effects units, turn these noises into the basic rhythms and melodies of their music. Heartbeat, for instance, can be used as drum and bass at the same time in some electronic music recordings. It is possible to dub-out, echo, delay, deepen, darken, lighten, slow down, or fasten up the sound of heartbeat with the computer. And after a proper mastering process you get something that sounds neither totally organic, nor totally inorganic.  These products are not only digitally bought and sold on the internet, but also exchanged with similar other products.

The affective qualities of these products are extremely high. The producers of the five most developed forms of electronic music, which are Techno, House, Electro, Trance, and Breakbeat, claim that they are the beholders of the threshold between the soma and the psyche, that with their walls of sound they keep them separate and yet contiguous to one another. 

What we witness in this time is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World turning into Rave New World.  A world in which the well known and the so called lines between mind and body, fantasy and reality, nature and culture, organic and inorganic, life and death, are not just blurred, but have completely disappeared. And yet, at the same, these lines are in the process of reappearance.

The recent developments in electronic music present us with a good example of how the inorganic has become, at least in sound, more organic than the organic. With the rapid development of sound producing machines it has become possible to create such sounds that while listening to it one feels like there is a living organism from a strangely familiar realm making noises in the room, or worse still, that the noises are coming from within one’s mind and body. Listening to this kind of music makes the mutual exclusiveness of the somatic and the psychic irrelevant. Especially after the three dimensional medium presented by CDs and DVDs it has become possible to present the sound to masses in a form that sounds more real than the original, live recording.

It would be wrong to assume, as many have done, that this kind of music is in touch with only a few listeners. On the contrary, since not only the listeners but also the producers of this kind of music have started to occupy dominant positions in the advertisement production business, it is not surprising that electronic music, and especially the underground minimalist techno-electro is increasingly being used as the background music surrounding the object advertised in many advertisements on radio and T.V. Based on the erasure of the boundary between the psychic and the somatic, or between the inorganic and organic, the use of minimalist electronic music in the advertisements of today’s hectic life-styles is a very good example to the exploitation of the life/death drives inherent in contemporary nihilistic culture driving and driven by what has almost become transglobal capitalism.  The LG U880 ultra-slim mobile phone advert on T.V. is precisely the hard-core of how this exploitation of the life/death drives takes place. In the advert there is heart beating in the phone. Or, the heart is shown to have a transparent phone surrounding it. And with the minimalist techno at the back, that is, sounds that are neither organic nor inorganic but both at the same time. The beating heart in the phone create the deep and dark bass sound with extremely electronic and yet organic sounding noises coming from within the phone.  It’s as though it is one’s own heart beating in the phone; this phone is you, so it’s yours… If we keep in mind that the transparency of the phone is fleshy, for there are capillaries of the phone, the overall impression created is one of ultra minimalist life reduced to its bare bones when in reality the LG U880 mobile phone is itself the product of exactly the opposite of an ultra minimalist attitude. The message is that this mobile phone is what attaches you to life, when in fact it detaches you from life as it is. The finishing words, “Life is Good,” only confirms my critique of this advertisement, of this marvellous sound-image which is an inorganic object disguised as a living organism. It is obvious that what’s at work here is the exploitation/oppression of the life/death drives, as the inorganic replaces the organic, and the real of death in the midst of life is expelled.

In this situation which I found myself Benjamin’s and Marcuse’s theories are insufficient in that they do not realize that it is precisely the reversing of the roles policy, that is, presentation of something as its opposite, of an inorganic entity as an organic entity for instance, or of that which is inside as if it is outside, that has to be left behind, for Panopticon and Leviathan are within and without the subject at the same time, and a reverse of the roles of the inside and the outside means nothing in this perilous time. 

For the solution of problems posed by the advanced projection-introjection mechanisms of what have become Superpanoptic societies, I attempt to show that post-structuralism and critical theory have never been as mutually exclusive as many suggest, especially in terms of the wrong and right questions that they left unanswered. If we look at Adorno’s and Foucault’s writings we can see that most of their thought is directed towards finding how to reconcile theory and practice. Just as theory and practice, post-structuralism and critical theory, too, are always already reconciled, because they come from Nietzsche, Marx, Freud. They may be always already reconciled but the only way to actualize this reconciliation is to realize their common goal; to put theory in the service of ordinary life, to develop the conditions of existence, and to practice freedom. 

 It will almost sound offensive to say that the new emerges only if some people become traitors and shake the foundations of their own mode of being, or at least undertake opening up spaces so that light can shine among all, or death can manifest itself. But one must take the risk of offending some others, for every situation requires its expression, every problem bears within itself at least half of its own solution. It is all a matter of putting theory and practice in the service of one another. Theory that does not match the truth of its time is for nothing. It is important to theorize practical ways of dealing with the banal accidents of an ordinary life. I think what I have just said is one of the things that both Foucault and Adorno would have agreed on.

5. The Nietzschean Subject

Here I turn to Nietzsche who creates the concept of bad conscience as the generator of illness, which is in turn fed by the illness it generates, giving birth to the man of ressentiment. Nietzsche’s ressentiment is what Klein calls envy. To be able to see the link between envy/ressentiment and the will to nothingness/the life-death drives, I shall start from the beginning, from the first year of life.

The Nietzschean subject is always at the periphery and perpetually in touch with the objects surrounding him. In fact he is not only in touch but also is defined by them. This subject is produced through what it consumes. The subject buys things and those things determine the subjects identity which is a non-identity. The subject becomes what it consumes, it projects what it has introjected. In a world full of violence, destruction and death, or “madness in every direction,” as Kerouac would have said, the subject becomes nothing but a projector of the evil within society. This paradoxical nature of the contemporary Nietzschean subject is a result of the turning of self into the other within in the process of becoming. The self of the present has not only become a prison-house of the others within itself but also it itself has become a self-contained monad with no relation to the outside and no awareness of the external world populated by the others’ selves.

The relation of a subject to the objects surrounding him/her shows us something about the subject’s relation to death. In a world which use value as opposed to the exchange value is important, the subject gets to know the nature of the objects and death more profoundly. But today use value is itself determined by exchange value. The world today is almost exactly the opposite of a world in which nothing is a substitute for another thing.

With societies based on exchange value the relationship between the subject and the object is confined in the paranoid-schizoid position. There remains no gap between the subject and the object when in fact there should be. Everything becomes a substitute for another thing and everything is substitutable. With the advance of global capitalism the subject itself becomes an object. The subject begins to act itself out as an object for the desire and consumption of the other. The subject becomes a substitute of itself.  With global capitalism the subject starts to feel itself as a machine; it becomes inorganic for itself when in fact it is essentially organic. In other words organs start to operate like non-organs, all organicity is replaced by inorganicity, life with death, and in this kind of a society everyone is always already dead.

Global capitalism indeed appears to have rendered everyone equal in relation to each other. They all have the equal rights to consume but in no way have all the means to do so. This status of the subject as a mere consumer, objectifies the subject as a subject of consumption. The subject is reduced to a consuming-excreting machine(naturally), or a mechanism of introjection-projection(culturally). That makes everyone substitutable by anyone else; they can take on each other’s roles, act themselves out as they are not, as someone else is. In other words rather than become no-one, no-body, imperceptible, they become something exchangeable and expendable. And yet it is only on the condition of feeling oneself as nothing rather than something, feeling of self as nothingness, can one go beyond one’s symbolic life driven by striving for security and omniscience. The subject should start to see the reduction of self to nothingness as a gain when from the perspective of the already existing symbolic order it is a loss of the difference of everything in relation to a subject or an object. In the absence of this kind of a subject who does not want to become an ordinary symbolic person, herd-instinct dominates all subjects. With the advance of global capitalism this herd-instinct can be said to have become nothing but a result of the exploitation of the life and death drives to reduce life to a struggle for and against life/death. The subject no longer has to carry the burden of being different. In this light and in this time we can see global capitalism creating not only the conditions of possibility for the subject to forget itself but also the conditions of impossibility for a remembrance of self, producing the non-knowledge of self as the counter-knowledge.

Now that Nietzsche’s autobiographical book Ecce Homo has become a symptom, an effect of his previous books, the other within of his oeuvre, in most parts of Europe, but especially in the United States of America and Britain, this book is considered to be a  prescription for the predominant way of “healthy living.” It will almost sound offensive to say that the other within of the past has become the self of the present, the non-reason inherent in reason has become the reason itself, and yet the questions remain: 

1. What can be learned from Nietzsche’s failure, which caused and continues to cause many other failures?

2. What are the conditions of possibility for a non-antagonistic and yet non-illusory relationship between the self and the other and how can they be sustained?

 Intermediation 1

In the previous chapter I tried to introduce certain Freudian concepts in relation to post-structuralism and critical theory. The importance of this first chapter lies in its attempt to link the concepts of the life drive and the death drive created approximately a century ago to contemporary cultural and critical theory. In the next chapter I will try to frame the context of the disagreement between Klein and Lacan in relation to Freud. The aim of this second chapter is to link the life drive and the death drive to the processes of introjection and projective identification. The chapter also includes an analysis of Derridean deconstruction in relation to the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position in the context of introjection and projective identification. On the whole the following chapter aims at connecting psychoanalytic theory and practice to more philosophical issues concerning creative and critical processes. 

 


[1] Sigmund Freud, Civilization, Society, and Religion, trans. Angela Richards (London: Pelican, 1985)

[2] Freud, 357

[3] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1985), 279

[4] Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 200

 1. The Cinematic Apparatus and The Psyche

 Ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.[1]

Ideology has a material existence.[2]

For Freud dreams are the beholders of the sleeping subject; dreams prevent waking up by turning a repressed desire into images.[3] How does the dream do that? To be able to answer this question we have to look at Freud’s concept of the Unconscious and how the repressive mechanism works.

With Christopher Columbus’s discovery of America the civilized were brought face-to-face with primitive groups of people. In the case of Freud’s concept of the unconscious, the civilized were facing their own wild side, the other within them. By discovering the unknown continent Columbus opened new fields for exploitation. As for Freud’s concept of the unconscious, it was its inescapable destiny to be subjected to exploitation. And with the advance of technology it becomes easier and easier to exploit the unconscious. Hollywood, political strategists, advertisement writers and many others burning with desire for more money and power thought it was a merit to develop technologies for the manipulation and exploitation of the unconscious. But Freud’s discovery was aimed at serving almost exactly the opposite purpose. Freud meant the unconscious to stand in for the other of a way of thought that tended to explain and define everything in terms of its exchange-value and conformity to the established order. Freud aimed at bringing people face to face with the truth of their being; that their rationality couldn’t exist without its opposite, the unconscious. In the unconscious, the drives that resist symbolization are in constant interaction with one another and yet without this chaotic interaction between the unconscious drives there can be no reason. How hard civilization tries to escape from the Real of desire by establishing truths with no basis and how hard it must have been for them to face the non-reason inherent in their reason, which they so proudly prohibited. Freud not only opens the way of access to that forbidden zone, but also names the unconscious mental processes, and calls this long forgotten forbidden zone the unconscious. So, in a way, Freud is not only Columbus but also Amerigo Vespuci. 

Freud calls the content of the unconscious the latent dream-thoughts. That which one sees in a dream is already a translation of this primal scene. The images in a dream stand in for the gap in the symbolic order; they symbolize the latent content of the dream, which are the unconscious drives. A dream turns these unconscious drives into the manifestations of the subject’s objects of desire. The subject’s dream is already a semi-symbolized form of the unnamable traumatic kernel, the Real of the subject’s desire. In the unconscious there is no desire, but only an oscillation between the life-drive and the death drive. What the dream does is to supply the unconscious with objects to which it can attach its drives, give them a meaning and turn the unconscious drives into conscious desire. Dreams keep the natural and the cultural separate but contiguous to one another. Dream language is closer to the dynamics of the unconscious than the logic of fantasies. Fantasies are more social than dreams and are the supports of the symbolic order, they are the products of a desire to fill the gap between the Real and the social reality. So the objects of desire, with which the subject finds itself bombarded by, shape the subject’s unconscious drives and determine what the subject will desire, what it will not.

The object of one’s desire plays a dominant role in the subject’s identification processes. But there remains a gap between the object of desire and the object of identification. This split between the subject’s objects of desire and objects of identification, the choice the subject makes at this very moment determines the subject’s identity, and yet the subject is not conscious enough to make the simplest choices, so this choice always turns out to be a forced choice.

We can see an example of this forced choice in Levity directed by Ed Solomon (2002). It is a film about a murderer who kills a young cashier and consequently gets jailed for life. He is released on good behaviour but when it comes to getting out of the prison he refuses to do so. They tell him that he has no choice but to choose freedom, the life outside the prison. He unwillingly leaves the prison. This man was feeling so guilty that being in prison was his only way of surviving the anxiety caused by his aggressive behaviour in the past. He believed he deserved this punishment and was happy to participate in its execution. He was, if not his own persecutor, at least his own executor. He became his own crime and punishment at the same time. It was his free choice to be in prison, that way he fantasized he was being redeemed. And with this phantasm he was cutting himself off from carrying the burden of his crime as a free man. With the jury telling him that he is now free, he does not have to be punished anymore, his fantasy collapses. He realizes that redemption requires an external source. That by believing he was being redeemed didn’t mean that he was really being redeemed. He has to be redeemed in the eyes of another, in the eyes of the one’s who suffered the most because of his crime.

In a standard process of development the subject is expected to choose the objects of desire from the opposite sex and the objects of identification from the same sex. The subject introjects the objects of the same sex as objects of identification and the objects of the opposite sex as objects of desire. In turn the subject projects his introjected objects of identification onto his objects of desire, the other sex, strengthening his image of self in the eyes of the objects of the same sex who are his/her objects of identification.

What turns the latent content into the manifest-content and manifest-content into symbols is called the transference mechanism, or the dream-work. The analyst becomes the machine interpreting the patient’s free associations, which is what the dream-work does to the unconscious drives and turns them into metaphors.

For, owing to the fact that dream-interpretation traces the course taken by the dream-work, follows the paths which lead from the latent thoughts to the dream-elements, reveals the way in which verbal ambiguities have been exploited, and points out the verbal bridges between different groups of material—owing to all this, we get an impression now of a joke, now of schizophrenia, and are apt to forget that for a dream all operations with words are no more than a preparation for a regression to things.[4]

Freud’s technique of interpretation aims at a reversed metamorphosis; the analytical process tries to reach the hidden-content through the manifest-content. So Freud has to retranslate the manifest content as close to the hidden content as possible. The hidden content is unattainable, and yet the reversed metamorphosis at least makes some progress in the way of initiating a backward motion, a regressive process. To initiate this regressive process Freud uses the technique of free association. Free association is used to make hitherto unmade connections between the manifestations of the unconscious in the way of translating the unconscious into conscious or semi-conscious terms. Repression produces the hidden content of the unconscious. Free association aims at making the hidden content manifest itself in and through metaphorical constructions of reality. If the therapeutic process is successful the subject begins to use metonymies.

With Freud’s free association and Klein’s play therapy, the subject learns to give a voice to the traumatic kernel, the Real of his unsatisfied desires. The subject’s realization of the unnamability of the Real is a sign of progress in the therapeutic process. So in a way the therapeutic process has to fail for progress to take place. The quality and the quantity of gaps, black holes, or white spots within a discourse produced by free association show the extent of loss and dissatisfaction of the subject.

  According to Freud the dream-work deforms the unconscious drives and turns them into a more acceptable form so that the subject can come face to face with them. This is like an actor who changes his costume and appears with a different identity in the second stage of a play. There are two psychic processes involved in the dream-work. These are displacement and condensation. For Freud the process of displacement involves a kind of change of roles between cultural values and libidinal energy. The aim of displacement is to project substitutes for the unnamable and disowned aspects of the self so that the subject can reintroject those split off parts of the self in more acceptable forms. This process of displacement can be clearly observed in fetishism. A fetishist directs his/her desire to an object other than the real object of desire. For instance if the object of desire is the penis the subject of desire replaces penis with a shoe; the shoe stands in for the real object of desire.

As for condensation, it involves a concentration of secret thoughts at one single point, a kind of movement towards one single object, so all the thoughts intermingle and disappear, they become an unrecognisable multitude of thoughts. Condensation is a kind of unconsciously willed confusion; a defence mechanism to keep the unwanted qualities of the self at bay.

 2. Dream, Fantasy, and Film

If the film and the daydream are in more direct competition than the film and the dream, if they ceaselessly encroach upon each other, it is because they occur at a point of adaptation to reality – or at a point of regression, to look at it from the other direction – which is nearly the same; it is because they occur at the same moment: the dream belongs to childhood and the night; the film and the daydream are more adult and belong to the day, but not midday – to the evening, rather.[5]

In The Imaginary Signifier Christian Metz emphasizes a very important aspect of the relationship between cinema and the unconscious. The dream belongs to childhood, to the night, to the unconscious, the Real; whereas film and fantasy belong to adulthood, the symbolic, and the consciousness; and yet, this consciousness itself belongs to the evening. What Metz actually wants to say is that even though cinema has shown us a lot it has at the same time hidden a lot of things from us; for each film is a veil on the Real, a single beam of light comes out of the projector and in the dimness of the cinematic apparatus one is almost hypnotized, looks semi-consciously at what he is being shown.

Imagine yourself sitting in a cinema auditorium on a rather comfortable seat. This is one of the very rare occasions when you would agree to sit quietly in the dark with a crowd of other people. The only source of light is the projector projecting the images onto the white wall. The white wall turns the projected light into motion pictures and you are looking at the pictures in wonderment. On your comfortable seat you are relaxed, passive, and your ability to move is restricted by an external force. This condition of yours is very similar to the condition of a half-asleep person between reality and the dream world. Watching a movie is like a passage from being awake to being asleep. As a spectator you are aware that what you are watching is not real and still you make yourself believe that it is not totally fictional. Watching a movie you are like someone who is just about to wake up or just about to fall asleep.

The dream materials are visual and audio images, just like the matter of cinema. Nevertheless, there are three fundamental and semiological differences between dreams and films. In The Imaginary Signifier Christian Metz distinguishes these three differences between dream and film as follows.

[…]first, the unequal knowledge of the subject with respect to what he is doing; second, the presence or absence of real perceptual material; and third, a characteristic of the textual content itself(text of the film or dream), about which we are now going to speak.[6]

            All of these differences are linked to the degree of wakefulness of the subject. In sleep there is total illusion, the subject may play a role in the dream’s text. But in cinema the subject cannot see itself on the screen, unless, of course, he is an actor or an actress who has taken part in the film. In cinema there is a sense of reality which puts a distance between yourself and what you see. When you are awake you are to a certain extent aware of the fact that what you are watching is fictional.

The second difference which Metz points out is concerned with the existence of the matter of perception. The cinematographic image is a real image, an image that is of a material; visual, audio. But in dreaming there is no matter of the dream, dream material is completely illusory, it doesn’t exist as an external object.

The third difference involves the textual content of the film itself. Compared to a dream the fictional film is much more logical. If we keep the likes of David Lynch movies apart the plot of the film mostly develops with a certain order conforming to the expectations of the spectator. But in dreams there is no plot for no one is telling anything to another person. The dream belongs nowhere.

After distinguishing these differences between cinema and dream Metz introduces another term. This is what Freud called ‘Tagtarum,’ or the daydream, a conscious fantasy. The daydream is closer to film in that there is a certain degree of consciousness operating within the subject when he/she is daydreaming, or fantasizing. Daydreams too, are experienced when one is awake. The reason why film has a logical structure is that the actors, directors, and spectators are all awake. Making and watching a film involves conscious, pre-conscious, and sub-conscious psychic processes. Fantasizing also involves these three psychic processes, and yet since a film is produced by conscious choices, it has a certain purpose, a certain meaning to convey; what it will become is planned beforehand, its every detail is written down. But fantasizing is a totally psychic process which has gaps and disconnections in it. When we are fantasizing our intention is not to convey a certain meaning to another person. In both processes Metz sees at work a kind of voluntary simulation. Both the daydreamer and the film spectator know that what they are seeing or imagining is not real; but they still make themselves believe that the case is the opposite.

Both the film spectator and the daydreamer replace the reality principle with the pleasure principle. In both cases there is a willed belief in an illusion that what one is seeing or imagining is actually taking place. Without this belief the subject cannot take any pleasure in fantasizing and watching a film. The sole purpose of these activities is to compensate for an unsatisfying reality. Fantasies and films are the supports of social reality, with them the Real is kept at bay, and the gap between the subject and nothingness is maintained. Nothingness is internal to the symbolic order. Just as the dreaming subject is governed by the unconscious the cinema spectator and the fantasizing subject are turning the Real into a source of pleasure, translating it into the symbolic order. The filmmakers try to communicate directly with the unconscious of the spectator. The unconscious is their target and they find images to match the unconscious drives. It is precisely this matching process that forms the unconscious, for there is nothing prior to the naming of the unconscious drives. Cinema turns the object of drives into socially acceptable and symbolically comprehensible forms through metaphor and metonymy.

According to Lacan metaphor is a product of condensation and metonymy is a product of displacement. The reason why these two forms of expression are so effective is that they are closer to the workings of the unconscious than the literal. So Lacan is able to say, “the unconscious is structured a like language.”

A metaphor is a product of repression and involves the replacement of an image with another image that will have a stronger effect. Metonymy is the product of using a part of the object to stand in for the whole of it. Metaphor and metonymy fill the gap between the unconscious and the social reality. They are the mediators between the two worlds.

“The ordinary reality we know dissolves into the proto-ontological Real of raw flesh and replaceable mask.”[7] Zizek is referring to a film, Face/Off, starring John Travolta and Nicholas Cage. In this film Travolta and Cage find themselves in a situation where whatever they do they act against themselves. They have each other’s faces. The message is that behind our faces there is the Real, the raw flesh, nothing to identify us as and with ourselves. The gap between the social reality and the Real is opened and two men find themselves playing the role of their enemy. The face becomes the mask veiling the Real. What we have here is rather than the mask being a metaphor standing in for the Real, is the face as a metonymy standing in for the Real.

Before this unveiling of a lack (we are already close to the cinema signifier), the child, in order to avoid too strong an anxiety, will have to double its belief (another cinematic characteristic) and from then on forever hold two contradictory opinions (proof that in spite of everything the real perception has not been without effect).[8] 

In some movies the failure to keep apart two contradictory positions is itself the cause of these movies’ good effect. A process through which the ordinary reality dissolves into the Real can be seen in David Lynch movies. In Mulholland Drive we have a young actress at the beginning of her Hollywood career. The movie narrates her process of dispersal. The imaginary, the symbolic, and the real progressively dissolve into one another and she becomes incapable of distinguishing between what is fictional, what is in her mind and what is social. It is only at the end of the film that we understand her real situation, namely, that she has lost the plot of her life, and she has lost it in the fictional world of Hollywood. To fill the space opened by this loss she becomes addicted to drugs and alcohol, and the more drugs she takes the bigger the internal space grows, the more the internal space grows the less she is able to make conscious choices.

 3. Projective Identification and Introjection

Klein makes a distinction between introjected objects and the internal objects. The internal objects include the introjected objects as well as the objects of identification and the a priori fantasy images. According to Klein introjection is a defence mechanism against the anxiety and the fear of the horrible inner world of the child. The child assumes itself populated by bad, aggressive, and tormenting objects and attempts to introject the external good objects. In other words the child tries to replace the internal bad object with the external good object. So introjection is a defence mechanism to protect not only the me but also the internal good objects.

For Klein the unconscious fantasy sets the foundation of all psychic processes. But Freud had said fantasizing is a defence mechanism to compensate for the frustrating and unsatisfying reality. Klein thinks that the unconscious fantasmatic production is the manifestation of instinctive processes. In Klein’s hands the unconscious becomes a much more active and productive dynamism in touch with what’s going on in the social reality. The importance of Klein’s discovery is that she shows how intimately related the child is with the social reality from the beginning of life. The child is turned towards the mother and the unconscious moves towards consciousness in and through relating to the objects surrounding him/her. For Klein one of the first external objects the child relates to is the mother’s breast. In the face of hunger the child starts crying for he/she has no other means of communication. The mother understands that the child wants milk. Presented with milk from the mother’s breast the child comes to realize that there is an external good object that is the solution to the problem of hunger. But when the flow of milk is interrupted the child becomes confused, with the effect of hunger. The child considers the breast as a bad object and becomes more aggressive. When the milk comes the child realizes that he/she had been attacking not only the source of bad but also the source of good. So the child understands that every object is good and bad at the same time, and it is the use into which the object is put that determines its particular goodness or badness. It is the way in which one relates to social reality that matters.

In the first year of life introjection and splitting are dominant; the child is governed by the death drive, which is the drive that emerges as a response to the frustration in the face of the impossibility of going back into the enclosed space and time of the womb in which all that the organism needs is supplied without the organism having to make any effort to obtain it.

To be able to cope with the death drive the subject projects some of his/her aggressiveness onto the external world represented by the mother. Resultantly the child recognizes the external world as divided within itself and populated by good and bad objects which are not good and bad in-themselves but become good or bad in relation to the other objects. Projective identification is another defence mechanism the child uses to cope with the difficulties of life. With projective identification, to protect the me and the internal good objects from a possible attack from the external bad object, the child projects the internal bad objects onto the external good object. The child confuses the external good objects, external bad objects, internal good objects, and internal bad objects. Everything is intermingled so the child becomes aggressive towards himself/herself and towards the external world. To cope with this difficult situation the child projects unities onto the external world and makes no distinction between the good and the bad. This means that the child has passed from the state of being governed by the death drive, to the state of being governed by the life drive.

In the third stage of development there is the depressive position. With the depressive position the child feels guilty for attacking not only the good object but also the bad object in the paranoid-schizoid position of introjection and projective identification. The child realizes that the loving and caring mother had been the target of paranoid attacks all this time. To compensate for the damage caused the child strives to make reparations to the relationship with the mother embodying the social reality. For Klein depressive anxiety is a sign of progress.

These psychic processes go on until the end of life. The child identifies his/her image on the mirror as himself/herself. Lacan calls Klein’s depressive position ‘the mirror-stage.’

In the Lacanian sense, too, in which the imaginary, opposed to the symbolic but constantly imbricated with it, designates the basic lure of the ego, the definitive imprint of a stage before the Oedipus complex (which also continues after it), the durable mark of the mirror which alienates man in his own reflection and makes him the double of his double, the subterranean persistence of the exclusive relation to the mother, desire as a pure effect of lack and endless pursuit, the initial core of the unconscious (primal repression). All this is undoubtedly reactivated by the play of that other mirror, the cinema screen, in this respect a veritable psychical substitute, a prosthesis for our primally dislocated limbs.[9]

In the mirror stage, a period of imaginary and narcissistic identifications, the child believes in the illusion which he/she sees on the mirror. He/she sees himself/herself as a totality and believes that that’s what he/she really is. It is a period of conflict between the self as the other’s object of desire and the self as the subject sees it. The reflection on the mirror starts the process of introjection and projective-identification that will go on until death.

[…] the experience of the mirror as described by Lacan is essentially situated on the side of the imaginary (=formation of the ego by identification with a phantom, an image), even if the mirror also makes possible a first access to the symbolic by the mediation of the mother holding the child to the glass whose reflection, functioning here as the capitalized Other, necessarily appears in the field of the mirror alongside that of the child.[10]

            The screen is the site of projective identification. I put myself in the place of the character and try to see the film from his perspective. In a way I narcissistically try to situate myself in the context of the film as a whole person. But as soon as the screen gains this mirror like quality it loses it. With the screen there is a more advanced process at work, and this process is called projective-identification, not merely identification. The subject is aware that he is not the character in the movie, but still takes on this other identity on himself as though he is the one experiencing all those adventures.

When I am watching a movie I become the eye of the camera. Everything happens around me and I am a mere observer of all these things. In a way, as I’m watching a movie I become a semi-god-like creature, seeing not-all hearing not-all from a position not above all; from a position which renders the binary opposition between the transcendental and the immanent irrelevant. I am within and without the events and I am at once here and somewhere else with my body and everything else. It is the eye of the other that makes the eye of the self possible. 

 

4. Cinema and Fetishism

Even shit has a commercial value, depending of course, on whose shit it is. While in the case of human shit you have to pay to get rid of it, in the case of animal shit it is said to be a very efficient and sufficient fertilizer for one who has learned to use it, rather than seeing it as something worthless because it cannot be eaten. “Inversely, it is this very terror that is projected on to the spectacle of the mother’s body, and invites the reading of an absence where anatomy sees a different conformation.”[11]

Since even the instincts are produced by the superpanoptic projection-introjection mechanism in which the subject finds himself/herself, giving free rein to the unconscious to express itself only produces projections of the evil within onto the without. For Freud the death drive is the effect of a striving for infinity, nothingness, and death. I would say it is also the cause of it.

Commodity fetishism is equal to will to nothingness in that it is the desire for the inorganic objects to stand in for nothingness, the Real of the subject’s desire. Capitalism replaces the use value of the objects with two-dimensional commercial value, so the subject desires to be desired, and he/she can only do that by adapting to the two dimensional sphere of commodity fetishism; by becoming a fetish object himself. If we recall Marcuse complaining that the one-dimensional is absorbing the two-dimensional  and also keep in mind that Marcuse’s two-dimensional culture has become the pre-dominant culture of today, we can see why the solution is to say, “I don’t see myself as you see me,” to the big Other in whatever form it appears in our lives.

In our opinion fetishism only occurs in sadism in a secondary and distorted sense. It is divested of its essential relation to disavowal and suspense and passes into the totally different context of negativity and negation, where it becomes an agent in the sadistic process of condensation.[12]

So the death drive produces new objects of desire by splitting the already existing objects. The subject as death drive, by splitting the symbolic, opens up spaces for the emergence of new objects of desire to stand in for nothingness and death.

The good object has moved to the side of knowledge and the cinema becomes a bad object (a dual displacement which makes it easy for ‘science’ to stand back). The cinema is ‘persecuted’, but this persistence is also a reparation (the knowing posture is both aggressive and depressive), reparation of a specific kind, peculiar to the semiologist: the restoration to the theoretical body of what has been taken from the institution, from the code which is being ‘studied.’[13]

Writing about cinema is essentially a criticism of the symbolic order, for both writing and cinematic production are themselves symbolic social activities. Since cinema exploits the life drive by satisfying the desire for something covering nothing, writing about cinema is essentially governed by the death drive which tries to expose the nothingness behind the symbolic. That which a film veils is nothing other than nothing; and exposing this nothingness behind the film introduces a split between the subject and the signifier. When looked at like that psychotherapy becomes critical of the existing social order, for by criticizing the film the critic heals the film industry hence having a healing effect on the spectator.

It is clear that fetishism, in the cinema as elsewhere, is closely linked to the good object. The function of the fetish is to restore the latter, threatened in its ‘goodness’ (in Melanie Klein’s sense) by the terrifying discovery of the lack. Thanks to the fetish, which covers the wound and itself becomes erotogenic, the object as a whole can become desirable again without excessive fear.[14] 

According to Metz cinema is a fetish object. Films stand in for an object that is absent. The reflection of images on the screen veil the nothingness behind them without which they would not have been seen. “The fetish is the cinema in its physical state. A fetish is always material: insofar as one can make up for it by the power of the symbolic alone one is precisely no longer a fetishist.”[15]

Cinema produces unattainable objects of desire. By filling in a gap they render the nothingness more unattainable. They give the impression that there is something they are hiding and that way they produce the desire for nothingness. Cinema’s power of exploiting the will to nothingness, however, is the only tool one has at hand to criticize the cinematic apparatus as a form of ideology.

Sublimation of the objects of desire takes place through cinema and television. The more they are rendered unattainable the more sublime they become. What cinema does is to create the illusion of presence. Cinema shows an absent object through presenting an object to substitute for the nothingness. So it is the presence of an absence that we see on the screen. To enjoy cinema the subject has to know that what he/she is watching is only a presence covering an absence, that it is that which stands in for the Real of the subject’s desire. So Metz can say, “the fetish is the cinema in its physical sense.”[16] Looked at that way fetish is that which is produced to stand in for the Real object of desire, which is nothingness, and is therefore produced to satisfy the will to nothingness.

Cinematic narrative doesn’t show events in their real sequence. There are cuts, gaps, spaces between the scenes. All those, cuts, gaps, spaces between the scenes are openings to an external reality; they give the impression that there is something external to that which is actually being shown. The spectator is made to believe that there is something he/she doesn’t know as to what’s really going on in the film. This curiosity for that which is unknown inherent in every human is that which cinema exploits. By making the spectator simultaneously believe and not-believe at what he/she is seeing on the screen, cinema creates an ambiguous relationship with itself and the spectator.

 By leaving gaps within the narrative, cinema invites projective identification. The spectator projects what he has inside him onto the absence within the filmic text. He fills those gaps with his internal partial objects and imposes a unity and continuity on the split narrative of the film.

The death drive involves splitting and introjection. The subject as death drive splits given unities and continuities. It is impossible for a spectator governed by the death drive to identify with the characters in the film. On the contrary, he desires nothing, identifies with nothing, without which he knows there can be no meaning. Rather than filling in the gaps within the narrative death drive puts them into the spotlight, it shows that those gaps are interior to the narrative itself. The incompleteness of the narrative is the condition of possibility for its meaning.

We can differentiate these two different types of spectatorship, one governed by the life drive and the other by the death drive, as associationism and dissociationsim.

In associationism the subject immerses himself in the medium of the imaginary and identifies with the characters in the movie. In dissociationsim the subject introduces new splits between the internal and the external objects and hence renders identification impossible for himself.

The life drive is the will to become one with the world, it is the force behind mimicry and associationsim. It is wrong to associate the death drive with mimicry and associationism. The subject as death drive dissociates and splits given unities and continuities. In horror movies the absence of the knowledge of truth for the spectator, that is, not being given the role of the omniscient eye, the spectator becomes curious and to understand what’s really going on in the movie he/she identifies with the characters. In the face of the abundance of gaps to be filled in the process of watching the film the life drive grows less and less strong for doing all the job throughout the watching process, while the death drive is oppressed and because of this very oppression it grows more and more strong. Eventually the life drive collapses and the death drive overflows the auditorium.

Although it is itself a product of the death drive, horror film exploits the life drive, that is, the spectator’s will to form unities, bind the action, desire to get rid of all gaps and inconsistencies within the narrative. The death drive negates negation and reaches the highest possible degree of affirmation. Thanatos wills nothing, whereas Eros wills nothingness. We can see that the Thanatos case is the reverse of what Nietzsche says, “man would much rather will nothingness than not will.” Eros wants to want nothing; and strives to form such unities that everything will fit in its place; the system will lack nothing, so Eros will want nothing. Thanatos introduces splits, and tries to reach the nothingness behind the symbolic. Thanatos wants nothing rather than nothingness. He wants nothing to show the nothingness in the midst of everything, that there is nothing behind all that there is.

While Eros wants to lack nothing, wants the lack of lack, Thanatos affirms life as it is and wants lack, wants something to lack, wants that lack to remain after all is said and done, so that he can desire the nothingness which that lack presents. Thanatos doesn’t want something to replace nothing, but rather wants the lack in everything. By negating negation the death drive affirms life as it is, that is, in its incompleteness, and with nothingness and death in its midst.

 

5. Butterfly Effect 

The main character in the Butterfly Effect “seizes hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.”[17] Butterfly Effect is a film from 2004 directed by Eric Bress and J. Mackye Gruber, in which Chaos Theory is applied to history and psychoanalysis. According to Chaos Theory an event which seems to be very insignificant in a sequence of events is in fact as important as any other event and the effects of a minor cause require some time to manifest themselves in relation to the macro situation.

With the Butterfly Effect the audience sees everything from the perspective of a young man who not only has flashbacks in the form of dreams, but who is also able to travel in time through reading his journals. As he reads the journal, first the words, then himself, and finally the whole room starts shaking and immediately after this falling into pieces of the scene the subject travels in time, or perhaps only in his personal history, and wakes up at another period of his own life. His aim is to change something so crucial to the present but which has taken place in the past, and so that way make some things a little bit better for the people surrounding him. But to be able to be present in the past he has to occupy the place of his presence in that particular slice of the past. That is why, as a child he has occasional blackouts during which disastrous things happen, such as a mother with her baby in her arms being blown up. His gift of travelling in time turns out to be his curse locking him up in a mental hospital as a hopeless case who believes he has journals through the reading of which he can go back and forth in time and put things right or wrong when in fact there are no journals and he has simply made all these things up in his mind. Each time he goes back in time to fix something bad, he causes something worse to happen. But that worse thing which happens takes place because of his intervention in the first place. Caught in this vicious cycle of a self-fulfilling prophecy he finally strikes the right chord, he goes back to the right time and fixes the right thing. Where he goes is not in the journals this time, for he is in the mental hospital, in a time where his journals do not exist or are not recognized as such. This time he goes back in time through an amateur home movie recorded when he and his girlfriend were kids, that is, before the girl makes the decision to stay with her father rather than her mother who moves to another city after their divorce. Her decision to stay with her father leads to her friendship with the boy and to the eventual disasters. In this time they are at a garden party. When the girl approaches him he says, “If you come near me again I’ll destroy you and your family.” And the little girl runs and hides behind her mother. What he is actually doing there is giving a voice to the evil at the right time, hence causing less worse things to happen in the future. Bringing out that repressed and anti-social behaviour out at the right time, or situating this free floating sign beneath the social reality, turns out to be less evil than the most good of society. It is all a matter of situating the act in the right time and the right place.                            

To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was” (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to retain that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a moment of danger. The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers. The same threat hangs over both: that of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. In every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it. The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of Antichrist. Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious.[18]  

Intervention in history, seeing in the past something which has never taken place, is itself an act opening up spaces for new possibilities to emerge. The fear of serving that which one thinks one is struggling against prepares the grounds for the realization of what the subject was afraid of.

A potential for change that has never initiated actual change cannot be a lost chance for a change. For since it has never taken place it cannot be a lost possibility.  Benjamin’s point when he says, “only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins,” is that “even the dead will not be safe” unless the enemy loses. How can even the dead not be safe? For when the enemy loses the lives of the dead will have been wasted for nothing, for these now dead people will have struggled and suffered for nothing. For then, not the enemy but “we, the friends of those who died for a good cause” will have written the history. For Benjamin it’s all a matter of who represents what happened.

“The spark of hope” that is to be fanned is not the hope of redemption, but the hope that redemption has already taken place. That we are already redeemed and yet it is precisely this state of being redeemed that makes it a forced-choice and yet a responsibility to tell the story of the past in such a way as to introduce a split between the past and the future which generates a new mode of being and initiates change. It is out of the space between the past and the future, or the subject of statement and the subject of enunciation, that something new emerges ex nihilo. The subject writes its difference from itself, all writing is writing the difference of the subject from the void. And yet since the void against which the subject writes is the subject itself, with each word the subject moves further away from itself. This performative contradiction inherent in language is the way things are in the world. The outside, the unconscious, is the shadow of language and the social reality.         

 6. The Island: Waiting for a day that will never come

The Island is a science-fiction movie directed by Michael Bay. Our hero, Lincoln Six-Echo (Ewan McGregor) wakes up from a nightmare in which he sees himself drowning. What we, the spectators don’t know yet is that Lincoln has actually woken up to a sterile world which has nothing do with the real world. Lincoln wakes up from a nightmare to what appears to be an unreal reality. As Lincoln wakes up he sees a screen in front of him on which is written “Erratic REM Sleep Cycle Detected,” followed by “Please Report to Tranquility Center.” Lincoln gets out of his bed and goes to the toilet. As he urinates, another screen appears in front of him with the words “Sodium Excess Detected, Advising Nutritional Control.” On top of all these a speaker intervenes: “A healthy person is a happy person.”

Lincoln is living in an environment in which he is surveilled and controlled at all times. This environment is in fact an underground factory which produces human clones. Lincoln is nothing but a clone produced to be consumed when the time comes. We, the spectators, will later on learn that this environment was an institution used by American Ministry of Defence for military research. Now it has been passed on to a medical corporation sponsored by extremely rich people to produce clones. These clones are the copies of those rich people who have various illnesses. Lincoln Six-Echo, for instance, is the clone of a Scottish man named Tom Lincoln who suffers from Hepatitis and who is expected to die in two years. This means that in two years time Lincoln Six-Echo will be killed and his organs will be transferred to his sponsor Tom Lincoln.

The DNA samples taken from the sponsors are used to produce clones. These clones are then grown in a womb-like environment until they reach the age of their sponsors. Some of the clones are grown for their hearts, some for their eyes, skins, and some for their internal organs. As they are grown they are almost injected a memory through audio-visual imagery, their consciousness is completely artificial just like themselves. Although they look no different from a normal human being they are in fact programmed to desire to go to The Island. They are continually told that they are the chosen ones, that they are the only survivors from a terrible epidemic which destroyed almost all life on earth, that they are lucky for being where they now are. Of course these clones need some kind of motive to be able to bear their monotonous existence. Their motive is waiting for the day on which they will win the lottery and go to the last piece of beauty left on earth after the epidemic; an exotic island, a heaven on earth. Through this lottery business the life in this institution is invested with a meaning. Educated to the level of fifteen year old children, the clones do not question their lives. They think that they really are chosen and they really want to go to the island. But Lincoln is unhappy and unsatisfied. He thinks there should be more to life than waiting for the departure towards the island. When he talks with his psychiatrist who is in fact the manager of the corporation, his psychiatrist tells him this: “You can’t see how lucky you are Lincoln. You have survived the epidemic, you are comfortable here, what else do you want?” Lincoln is not satisfied with this answer and goes to places he shouldn’t, sees things he better not. Following an insect Lincoln finds himself at a hidden section of the institute, a hospital, where he sees that those who are chosen to go to the island are in fact killed for their organs. Lincoln understands that there is no such thing as an epidemic, and no such place as the island, that all this island business is merely a fantasy to keep the clones operating efficiently as they wait.

On the night of the day that Lincoln learns the truth his lover Jordan Two-Delta (Scarlet Johansson) wins the lottery. Realising that the turn of death has come to Jordan, Lincoln goes to her room to warn her. After that the movie turns into a typical adventure movie in which many cars explode and many people die. At the end our hero and heroine destroy the corporation and save all the clones from their miserable existences.

The importance of this movie derives from the way in which it criticizes modern power structures which produces subjects in such a way as to serve the system which consumes them. The subjects are subjectified so as to feel happy and content with being locked in hopeful dreams. The Island shows that even what we call the unconscious is a construct, that the drives are not natural, but rather cultural products. 

            What we see here is how the life drive turns out to be the death drive. As the clones wait for the day they will finally start living a real life full of pleasures, they are in fact waiting for the day they will die. As they die the system in which they are locked gains strength. Through the death of the subjects the system prolongs its own life.

 Intermediation 2

In the previous chapter I attempted to analyze the cinematic apparatus in relation to psychoanalysis. Although I haven’t mentioned his name, Deleuze’s influence was pervasive in the previous chapter. Already in Difference and Repetition Deleuze understands the brain as a screen. To my mind Deleuze’s understanding of the brain as a screen is rooted in his recreation of the concept of death drive in Difference and Repetition. His argument against the representational mode of being is actually an attack on the transcendence oriented conceptualizations of Freud’s drive theory. Deleuze’s corpus can also be read as an enquiry into the relationship between unconscious drives and conscious desires. In this context fidelity in Deleuzean philosophy requires a re-conceptualization of the brain not only as a screen, but also as a projector.

I think the cinematic apparatus stimulates not only the conscious mind, but also the unconscious drives, hence producing not only consciousness, but also the unconscious. I agree with Deleuze that the unconscious is productive of desire, but what I think to be missing in Deleuze is that the unconscious itself is always already produced by external forces such as cinema, media, and television. So the desire produced by the unconscious is always already adaptive to the predominant form of desiring which serves the reproduction of the predominant order of things.

In the next chapter I shall attempt to provide a detailed analysis of Cronenberg’s movies in relation to the concepts of projective identification, introjection, creativity and destructivity.

 


[1] Louis Althusser, The Ideological State Apparatuses, from “Mapping Ideology,” ed. Slavoj Zizek (London: Verso, 1994), 123

[2] Althusser, 125

[3] Sigmund Freud, The Interpreation of Dreams, 101-8

[4] Sigmund Freud, On Metapsychology, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1984), 237

[5] Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, trans. Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster and Alfred Guzetti (London: Macmillan, 1982), 136-7

[6] Metz, 120

[7] Slavoj Zizek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (London: Verso, 2001), 183

[8] Metz, 70

[9] Metz, 4

[10] Metz, 6

[11] Metz, 69

[12] Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone, 1989), 32

[13] Metz, 80

[14] Metz, 75

[15] Metz, 75

[16] Metz, 75

[17] Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1973), 257

[18] Benjamin, 257

I philosophise only in terror, but in the confessed terror of going mad.[1]

 Jacques Derrida.

The circle of the eternal return is a circle which is always excentric in relation to an always decentered center.[2]

Gilles Deleuze.

 1. Architecture of The White Hotel  

Published in 1981, D.M. Thomas’ The White Hotel is a post-structuralist novel which employs parody to expose the absences of meaning inherent in itself. In Prologue D.M. Thomas gives the impression that he is publishing the real letters written by Freud and his friends. Written in the form of a documentary this part is followed by a surrealist poem giving voice to Lisa Erdman’s dreams and fantasies. Here we look at the world with the eyes of a young man and a young woman. They have no identities, their world is not separated from themselves, and nothing is categorized. There everything can turn into something else including its opposite, everything is replaceable with another thing, and everything is intermingled, no distinction is made between internal and external objects: Stars fall from the sky like rain, trees mix with the sea, young woman turns into Magdalene, and drinks the wind. The consciousness and the body of the man and the woman become one with the universe in this Surrealist poem. In this first chapter the gap between what is real and what is not is filled, the boundary between the fictional and social reality is erased, and a fantastic vision of the world is presented. In the part following this poetic part the same events are narrated in prose employing the techniques of the symbolists and abstract expressionists.

The third chapter is the case study of Lisa Erdman, aka Frau Anna. Frau Anna’s illness and the therapeutic process are narrated in such a way as to give the impression that we are reading Freud’s notebook. The language of this chapter is scientific and conforms to the norms of scientific objectivity. There are occasional footnotes and scientific documents. It is only through a footnote that the reader is given hint that all this is actually fictional and has nothing to do with what has actually happened. In this footnote it said that Freud’s notebook containing the case studies was burnt in 1933. If the text is based on facts so too must the footnote be based on facts; so what we have been reading cannot be Freud’s own writing. In other words the text is not taking itself seriously, the text is deconstructing itself, shifting the ground beneath his feet and eventually collapsing in on itself. The text negates what it claims to be the truth and turns into a parody of itself.

In the fourth chapter all the forms and contents of narrative in the previous chapter are brought together under the roof of a traditional and realistic forms of writing. Events are situated in their proper historical contexts and are presented linearly with all the cause-effect relationships in order. The characters are presented in accordance with the symbolic order and show signs of progress in time. In this context science, art, and life seem to be interconnected and the reader is given the impression that rational discourse on them and their relationship with each other is possible.

The fifth chapter is almost exactly the opposite of the second chapter. The subject who had become one with the universe and was continually changing in harmony with nature in the second chapter, becomes the subject of death, alienation, trauma, and separation. This chapter is about the Ukrainian Jews who thought they were being taken to Jerusalem by train, but soon found themselves naked and about to be killed. Lisa is among these Ukrainian Jews. Alienation, detachment, instability, human destroying human, fear and violence are all analyzed in terms of their relations to death and nothingness. The narrative form is mostly naturalistic, and yet touched by a little bit of symbolism here and there.

The sixth and the last chapter of The White Hotel resembles the second chapter in that it is composed of dream-visions. Here all events and all sensations are accepted without questioning, and even without comprehension. This unmediated knowledge is articulated through a surrealistic narrative.

As a whole The White Hotel is an attempt to find a way of expressing the trauma of the Holocaust. In his The Holocaust and The Literary Imagination, Lawrence Langer investigates the representability of the traumatic experiences and their effects.

How should art – how can art? – represent the inexpressibly inhuman suffering of the victims, without doing an injustice to that suffering? If art, as Adorno concedes, is perhaps the last remaining sanctuary where that suffering can be paid honest homage, enshrining it permanently in the imagination of the living as the essential horror that it was, the danger also exists of this noble intention sliding into the abyss of its opposite.[3]

For Langer, trying to represent the Holocaust invites the negation of the real situation by tranquilizing the reader with a kind of aesthetic sublimation resulting in temporary satisfaction. So the writer should find a suitably disturbing form to be able to make the reader feel the pain of the suffering. The writer should aim at such a way of expression as to disturb the reader, rather than provide him/her with fetish objects to stand in for the Real of the Holocaust. The Real may be unattainable, it may be that which is non-symbolizable, the unnamable truth of what really happened, and yet splitting the narrative, interrupting the continuity, dissolving the structure, may themselves turn out to be the very qualities that renders it possible for the reader to touch the Real without really touching it.

In The White Hotel we only glimpse at the extent of loss and get a sense of the inordinate measure of suffering involved in traumatic experiences.

The mind resists what it feels to be imaginatively valid but wants to disbelieve; and the task of the artist is to find a style and a form to present the atmosphere or landscape of atrocity, to make it compelling, to coax the reader into credulity – and ultimately, complicity. The fundamental task of the critic is not to ask whether it should or can be done, since it already has been, but to evaluate how it has been done, judge its effectiveness, and analyse its implications for literature and society.[4]

How can you make someone feel the other’s pain through language, especially when this pain is unnamable? For Langer identification is necessary for ethical action. So the writer should find the proper way of saying what he means to say, in such a way as to create the conditions of possibility for the reader’s identification with the character. Langer thinks that making the reader identify with the holocaust victims invites ethical questioning of the situation. Langer seems to be blind to what is really at work in an identification process.

The Real, the traumatic kernel resists signification, it is an irruption which exists in the form of an absence. Creating gaps within the text itself helps to create the effects of absence and loss on the reader. But there is also a negative aspect of producing absence of meaning and presence of obscurity in the text. The writer may find himself/herself inviting projective identification with his/her characters. Creating absences of meaning within the text does not always alienate the reader from the text, quite the opposite may be the case; it leaves spaces within the text onto which the reader can project his/her Narcissistic image of self.

It is only in the shape of such novels as The White Hotel that we can reconcile ourselves to being caught up in an irresolvable conflict-situation between the life drive and the death drive. It is this antagonism inherent in human-condition itself that fascism exploited, and has not ceased to exploit in the way not only of murdering masses, but also of making the masses murder themselves and one another.

At a first glance The White Hotel looks like a poetic novel about the Jewish Holocaust feeding on the mythological imagery of psychoanalysis. In the Author’s Note, D.M. Thomas says,

One could not travel far in the landscape of hysteria – the terrain of this novel – without meeting the majestic figure of Sigmund Freud. Freud becomes one of the dramatis personae, in fact, as discoverer of the great and beautiful modern myth of psychoanalysis. By myth, I mean a poetic, dramatic expression of a hidden truth; and in placing this emphasis, I do not intend to put into question the scientific validity of psychoanalysis.[5]

The Prologue of The White Hotel is composed of five letters written by Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, his lover Gisela, and Sachs. The first letter is written by Ferenczi to his lover Gisela on 8th September 1909. In this letter Ferenczi talks about his feelings and fantasies and as he does this he mentions the disagreement between Freud and Jung. According to Ferenczi, Jung has interpreted one of Freud’s dreams in such a way as to cause anxiety in Freud. And upon this Freud said to Jung that he would never ever give any information to him about his personal life. What Thomas does in the third chapter to criticize Freud becomes relevant here. Thomas tells of the basic principles and techniques of psychoanalysis using the discourse of psychoanalysis in a dramatic way, that is, by dramatizing psychoanalysis and parodying Freud. The relationship between the Id, the ego, and the super-ego, together with the external factors influencing this relationship are narrated through Freud’s notes on a case study. Frau Anna, who is in fact Lisa Erdman, is the object of study. Freud interprets Lisa’s writings and speeches, and the reader reads this interpretation as part of the novel. From what Freud writes about Lisa the reader gets the message that Freud is a human, as you see he is in error about Lisa, his interpretations are misinterpretations and are limited by his desires, anxieties, and obsessions; he cannot be objective, he can never know the truth of Lisa’s words, which Thomas will tell us later in his novel.

At the beginning of his career Freud did think that the cause of mental illnesses is the return of the repressed contents of a personal unconscious, which were mostly of a sexual nature. Jung, on the other hand, linked the cause of mental illnesses to what he called a collective unconscious which was the accumulation of the experience of humanity throughout history as a whole. For Freud the cause of illness had something to do with a past personal event, whereas for Jung mental illness had something to do with the present and its relation to the future. Jung concentrated on the present moment in which the past and the future dissolved into one another, but Freud insisted on looking for the cause of illness in the personal history of the patient. Throughout the novel Freud links Lisa’s mental and physical problems to some traumatizing sexual experiences she had when she was a young girl. According to Freud every metaphorical image Lisa uses in her surreal poems is a translation of Lisa’s unconscious desires, they are the returned forms of a repressed memory, symptoms of a traumatic event. For instance Freud interprets the imagery of white hotel in Lisa’s dreams as a manifestation of her will to unite with the maternal body, and perhaps a will to go back into the secure environment of the womb in which nothing is required of the organism. Nietzsche would have said that Lisa’s will is a will to nothingness, rather than willing nothing. Lisa does get better after Freud’s therapy, she returns to music, she even gets married. But Lisa soon realizes that this is only a temporary period of happiness. Lisa thinks that her mental problems have something to do with the future, rather than the past. The reference to Jung is obvious. In a letter she writes to Freud she confesses that she told lies to Freud about her past. As for the reason behind her lies Lisa says,

Is there any family without a skeleton in the cupboard? Frankly I didn’t always wish to talk about the past; I was more interested in what was happening to me then, and what might happen in the future. In a way you made me become fascinated by my mother’s sin, and I am forever grateful to you for giving me the opportunity to delve into it. But I don’t believe for one moment that had anything to do with my being crippled with pain. It made me unhappy, but not ill.[6]

            The difference between Jung and Freud is a difference in method. Freud asks why this dream, why has the patient had this particular dream rather than any other? But Jung says that his own aim is the purpose of the dream, what the dream introduces to the patient’s world. Although Thomas doesn’t bring Jung and Lisa together at this stage of the novel, he implies that Jung’s attitude is more convenient for Lisa’s therapy. That Lisa’s symptoms, rather than being the manifestations of a sexually oriented neurosis as Freud assumed,  are related to the Holocaust to come, that his symptoms are themselves the emotional response she gives to the aggressive impulses haunting Europe is very similar to what Jung experienced in 1910’s. In 1910’s, Jung, just like Lisa, was having hallucinations and was relating these to his personal life. But later it became clear to Jung that these hallucinations were a result of the approaching violence on a massive scale. In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung writes that following the death of some of his friends he suffered from mental and physical problems similar to those of Lisa.

            The couples Eros/Thanatos, Heaven/Hell, love/hate, Venus/Medusa in Lisa’s poem are references to Jung’s theories. For Jung the archetypes in the collective unconscious of humanity is made of a series of oppositions. Among these good and evil are the most important ones and are the two inseparable absolutes. In the novel Lisa says,  

What torments me is whether life is good or evil. I think often of that scene I stumbled into on my father’s yacht. The woman I thought was praying had a fierce, frightening expression; but her ‘reflection’ was peaceful and smiling. The smiling woman (I think it must have been my aunt) was resting her hand on my mother’s breast (as if to reassure her it was all right, she didn’t mind0. But the faces – at least to me now – were so contradictory. And must have been contradictory in themselves too: the grimacing woman, joyful; and the smiling woman, sad. Medusa and Ceres, as you so brilliantly say! It may sound crazy, but I think the idea of the incest troubles me far more profoundly as a symbol than as a real event. Good and evil coupling, to make the world. No, forgive me, I am writing wildly. The ravings of a lonely spinster![7]

            Jung’s answer to Lisa’s question is in his Psychology and Alchemy. According to Jung,

[…] in the self good and evil are indeed closer than identical twins! […] Hence the truth about the self – the unfathomable union of good and evil – comes out concretely in the paradox that although sin is the gravest and most pernicious thing there is, it is still not so serious that it cannot be disposed of with probabilist arguments.[8]

            From Ferenczi’s letter to Freud at the beginning of the novel we learn that Jung offends Freud by interpreting imagery of “peat-bog corpses” as the “bodies of prehistoric men mummified by the effect of the humic acid in the bog water.”[9] Jung connects these “peat-bog corpses” to the primitive “pre-historic monster” running free in the unconscious. Freud almost faints upon hearing Jung’s interpretation and furiously accuses Jung of being full of envious feelings toward him.

            At the end of the novel, however, the “peat-bog corpses” turn out to be something completely other than what Freud and Jung thought they were. Thomas questions not only Freud’s but also Jung’s theories of the unconscious. The “peat-bog corpses” are neither symptoms of neurosis, as Freud says, nor are they signifiers of the primitive side of man as Jung says. The “peat-bog corpses” refer to the traumatic kernel of what happened during the holocaust, the thousands of holocaust victims massacred at Babi Yar. Neither Freud’s nor Jung’s theories can interpret and cure Lisa’s illness, because they both impose a symbolic meaning upon the Real of Lisa’s experiences.

            Just like psychoanalysis, literature too tries to symbolize the Real and translate the unconscious drives into conscious and desirable forms. The forms, however, are false representations of the unconscious, and usually give false forms to percepts and affects; literature is a falsification of the Real. In accordance with this, Thomas often refers to other literary and non-literary texts, makes connections between them to expose their self-contradictions, his meaning itself dissolves in this web of relations; meaning proliferates. Finding himself/herself in this hubris  of intertextuality, in this abundance of meaning, the reader thinks that he/she has understood the novel, when in fact he/she is drowning in the meaninglessness overflowing the text. All this illusions collapse with the chapter about Babi Yar. It becomes clear to the reader that it was all an illusion, and behind this illusion there is nothing but a big, black, hungry spider waiting for him/her. Where there should have been a void, death, there is this black spider to stand in for it. This black spider is the Lacanian objet petit a par excellence. In The White Hotel the objet petit a is a life consuming monster projected onto the Real.

Lisa sighed. “Why is it like this, Richard? We were made to be happy and to enjoy life. What’s happened?” He shook his head in bafflement, and breathed out smoke. “Were we made to be happy? You’re an incurable optimist, old girl!”[10]

2. Is Everyman an Island?

Islands are either from before or after humankind.[11]

Gilles Deleuze

 William Golding’s Lord of The Flies is an allegory of the death-drive inherent in human nature. It is a reversal of Ballantyne’s The Coral Island. In direct opposition to The Coral Island in which three young men establish the British culture on an island after their ship sinks in the Pacific Ocean, in Lord of The Flies we have children who become deranged and lose control of their aggressive impulses on a deserted island. In the absence of an external authority they become more and more violent. Golding is implying that humankind is violent by nature and the absence of symbolic order initiates a regressive process governed by the unconscious drives leading to violence and destruction.

            People prefer security and certainty to truth, they want an unshakable, stable order in which they can feel secure. They want object relations that sustain the conditions of impossibility for dispersal and death. Their will is a will not to truth but to security of the womb. And yet this striving for security itself brings calamities on the subject. For being in pursuit of the past is a product of will to nothingness and will to nothingness is nothing but the desire for death disguised as desire for the mother’s womb. Science attempts to construct the relationship between the subject and its objects in such a way as to serve the ideology, which subjects the individual to certain rules and regulations in the way of manufacturing an illusory sense of security. This is the definition of ideology in a nutshell. For Socrates, as Nietzsche points out in The Birth of Tragedy, one has to be judged before the courts of Logos, become namable, become an object of knowledge, to be able to become nice and good.

How can the good principle win over the bad principle? To answer this question I turn back to Lord of The Flies and Deleuze’s definition of an island as it appears in Desert Islands. An island is the proper place for horror fiction. An island is detached from the external world; it is surrounded by water and is closed in on itself. On an island the subject is alone and this aloneness in the absence of a symbolic order brings the subject closer to its primordial form which is the state of being governed by the death-drive. On an island everything starts anew and progresses in time. A generic singularity is like an island to be sown with the seeds of new forms of life. The concept of island has for a long time been an object standing in for either the dark side or the brighter side of civilization. In Thomas More’s Utopia for instance, we see a better world contrasted with the dark world of the dominant symbolic order in More’s day. Likewise, in Aldous Huxley’s Island we see all the social problems of humanity solved on an Island called Pala. In Pala, family structure, habits of consumption-production, relation to body, healthy living, etc. all take a new form. In Brave New World Huxley had portrayed an exact opposite situation in which a knowledge based on the principles of totalitarianism was the regime governing life, love, and truth.

The island in Lord of The Flies becomes the stage on which the children regress to a primitive state and all their aggressive impulses come to the fore as a result of the absence of certain governing principles imposed on them. Golding’s attitude can easily be considered conservative, or even as advocating the goodness of totalitarianism.

            Golding’s pessimism is divided within itself. It is his intellect that is pessimistic, as for his will it’s highly optimistic. With the pessimism of his intellect he controls his will and keeps optimism at bay. When the intellect is pessimistic it strives to make things better and if the will is ill then this striving to make things better turns into a will to nothingness. Although the intellect seems to be the uniting force, the life-drive, represented by Eros, reverse is the case, for it is will that is the uniting force and the intellect is the splitting force. Intellect splits objects surrounding the subject in the way of attaining an indivisible remainder. Atomization of thought stops when one reaches that indivisible remainder, which is the unsymbolizable traumatic kernel, the real of one’s desire, which is the death-drive. It is only through entry into the symbolic order that the death-drive turns into the life-drive. In this context, we can say that the life-drive belongs to the depressive position and the death-drive belongs to the paranoid-schizoid position. On a deserted island the subject regresses to paranoid-schizoid position and in its detachment becomes aggressive towards the objects surrounding it. Since there is no object at which the subject can direct its aggressiveness the subject turns against itself. On an island there is no object at which the subject can project his bad objects. The bad objects explode like shit and poison the subject which increases the rapidity of deterioration and regress to a state before birth, which is the same state as that of after death. It is on an island that the conflict between the life drive and the death drive emerges on the surface in the form of conflict-events. These conflict-events give birth to symptoms. In the process of turning these symptoms into objects of knowledge the psychoanalyst, philosopher, artist, or scientist, all translate it into acceptable forms, that is, they give forms to affects, percepts, and concepts in the way of making the subject get rid of this fundamental antagonism. All life is conflict and on a deserted island this conflict and the suffering it causes are magnified by inordinate measures. An island is a microscopic setting for the exposition of the other within, the evil, the tyrant, the fascist in everyone of us, to which, according to Nietzsche, not only the intellect but also the will submit.

Perhaps Nietzsche’s most important contribution to philosophy is not only the distinction he makes between knowledge and truth, but also the asymmetrical relationship he establishes between will and intellect, a reversal of Scopenhauer’s symmetrical model in which the will is portrayed as the exact opposite of intellect. When Nietzsche says “man would much rather will nothingness than not will,” what he wants to say is that man would prefer to want to contain nothingness, that is, introject the emptiness opened by the death of God, rather than prefer not to have anything, which would mean projecting everything in him onto the object cause of desire, hence disqualifying it as bad-object. This also means that the subject ceases to be a subject, but becomes an object of the life-drive. Life-drive, with its unificatory and binding force, constitutes not the subject but the absence of the subject. By imposing a unity on the infinity of the subject as death-drive, Eros subjectivizes the subject in process and turns it into a static entity, an object of desire. It is from then onwards that the subject is shaped as an object of desire under the rule of the symbolic order. To escape from the condition of being caught up in this system which the subject reproduces even when he thinks he is negating it consists in surviving the conflict between the life-drive and the death-drive, in other words, passing across the gap separating knowledge and truth, and fill a space in time as a symbolically self-identical subject, while the Real subject is oppressed and strives to signify the gap inherent in the symbolic order. It is only through splitting the given unities and continuities that the Real subject can manifest itself. This Real can only manifest itself in the form of absences, gaps, splits, which are themselves the openings to the Real of the subject as the death-drive.

It is the vicious cycle of the life and death drives that is being produced and exploited by global capitalism today. Through a manipulation of the healthy conflict, the relationship between the life and death drives is turned into antagonism. Undecidability, absence of foundational truth procedures, loss of principles, and declarations of the end of history are all manifestations of a discursive disease which is very rapidly contaminating the relationship between humans and their own health. In a world where a normal person must have a therapist, where having a therapist is a sign of normalcy, there can be no other choice but to shake the foundations of the illusions on which the health of many generations to come depends.

 3. The Projection-Introjection Mechanism in Jack Kerouac’s The Subterraneans

 The consequences of projection of fantasies onto the Real can be clearly observed in Kerouac’s The Subterraneans, which was quite a subversive book in its time, carrying Kerouac quite high up the cultural ladder, and in Burroughsian “causing thousands of Levi’s sold.”

In The Subterraneans we see Jack Kerouac’s persona Leo oscillating between attraction to and repulsion by Mardou who is a Cherokee American. One half of Leo loves Mardou and the other half is afraid of this love. If in one chapter Leo declares his love for Mardou, in the next chapter we see him resenting her. Leo’s oscillation between the life drive and the death drive constitute a movement between negation and the transcendence of this negation. Affirmation always remains at bay for Kerouac and his character Leo. Perhaps only at the beginning of the novel he gets a bit closer to affirmation, but this affirmation is in no way an affirmation of Mardou as she is. Rather, it is the affirmation of what has happened throughout the novel, an affirmation of that which has lead to the break-up of Mardou and Leo, as if what has taken place was what actually happened, rather than a projection of Leo’s paranoid fantasy on what has actually happened. At the end of the novel it becomes clear that all that has been lived had been lived for this novel to be written, rather than for its own sake.

[…] this was my three week thought and really the energy behind or the surface one behind the creation of the Jealousy Phantasy in the Grey Guilt dream of the World Around Our Bed.)—now I saw Mardou pushing Yuri with a OH YOU and I shuddered to think something maybe was going on behind my back – felt warned too by the quick and immediate manner Yuri heard me coming and rolled off but as if guiltily as I say after some kind of goose or feel up some illegal touch of Mardou which made her purse little love loff lips at him and push at him and like kids.[12]

Upon having the dream Leo begins to see everything through the keyhole of his obsession that one day Mardou will sleep with Yuri if she hasn’t already done so. I would like to read this story with the story of Adam and Eve’s fall from Heaven to Earth in mind, or the passage from the old Earth to the new Earth. What’s at stake here is the conflict between what’s going on in Leo’s mind as to what’s going on in Mardou’s mind and what’s really going on in Mardou’s mind. There is, in reality, nothing going on in Mardou’s mind. It is Leo projecting what he read in the Bible onto Mardou’s mind, what he read in the Bible being that it was Eve who caused the fall, for it was her who tempted Adam to eat the apple. So Leo is projecting what he has introjected from the Bible. And the Bible was the representation of women in general and his mother in particular for Kerouac. The preconception in Leo’s mind that women are evil, sinful, and guilty by nature both attracts and repels Leo. This state of being caught in a movement between repulsion/attraction ties the subject with an endless chain of negative associations to his own fear of being betrayed, pushing him further towards madness and death. The final words of the book bring the end which Leo was from the beginning of the relationship more than willing to reach: separation and through writing it down reunification with the lost object. For as we know from Freud, “writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person.”

And I go home having lost her love.

And write this book.[13]

  Leo believes that he has had the dream and that if he has the dream of it the sexual intercourse in real life has either taken place or will take place in the future. Kerouac/Leo is, “at present,” writing The Subterraneans. And everything has already taken place; the sequence of events follows this way: Leo has the dream, Mardou engages in sexual intercourse with Yuri, Mardou and Leo break up, Leo continues the daydream, laughs to retain sanity in the face of this tragedy, and goes home and writes this book. In it there is no true story; and it doesn’t matter whether there is or not a true story other than the story of an unhappy consciousness running towards its death in and through a story of love, affection, resentment, guilt, and compassion, which exposes the symptoms of a life as it unceasingly wills its subject’s end.

[…]still making no impression on my eager impressionable ready-to-create construct destroy and die brain – as will be seen in the great construction of jealousy which I later from a dream and for reasons of self-laceration recreated…[14]

Now, Leo sees Mardou in bed with Yuri and obsessively believes that his dream will come true. Leo believes himself to be a clairvoyant, that he has the ability to know things prior to seeing them actually taking place before his eyes. This he has introjected from Mardou herself, who, in a Nietzschean fashion, believes, does, and says things which simultaneously repel and attract Leo. There is no linear narrative in Mardou’s story about her adventures with the subterraneans of San Francisco and Leo likes it because there remains lots of gaps for him to fill with his fantasies later on when he is writing his story. Say what she may,

I got nervous and had some kind of idea about Mike, he kept looking at me like he wanted to kill me – he has such a funny look anyway – I got out of the house and walked along and didn’t know which way to go, my mind kept turning into the several directions that I was thinking of going but my body kept walking straight along Columbus altho’ I felt the sensation of each of the directions I mentally and emotionally turned into, amazed at all the possible directions you can take with different motives that come in, like it can make you a different person – I’ve often thought of this since childhood, of suppose instead of going up Columbus as I usually did I’d turn into Filbert would something happen that at the time is insignificant enough but would be like enough to influence my whole life in the end? – What’s in store for me in the direction I don’t take? – and all that, so if this had not been such a constant preoccupation that accompanied me in my solitude which I played upon in as many different ways as possible I wouldn’t bother now except but seeing the horrible roads this pure supposing goes to it took me to frights, if I wasn’t so damned persistent –’ and so on deep into the day, a long confusing story only pieces of which and imperfectly I remember, just the mass of the misery in connective form –[15]

What then, is this “connective form”? Who then, is the subject of this “mass of misery pieces of which are imperfectly remembered”? There is a different way of remembering in action here, a different way of being in relation to time and language in this “imperfect remembrance” of the lived experiences. The problem with Kerouac’s writing is that he is not separating his introjected object from the projecting subject. Kerouac wants to represent Mardou as she is and yet he at the same time wants to prove that Leo was the one pulling the strings from the beginning. What Mardou is actually trying to convey is veiled by Kerouac who makes it impossible for the reader to distinguish between fiction and reality, self and other, subject and object, projected and introjected. His voice dissolves into the voice of Mardou and Mardou’s story remains unheard. Rather than unveiling, Kerouac’s writing not only veils but also manipulates the truth of the other for his abusive purposes. All his life Kerouac struggled to traverse this field of partial representations of the other, but being an innocent fascist he repeatedly fell into his own traps and failed in affirming the real as it is. If he could have loved the real as it is, he could have “delivered himself from his automatic reactions,” and thus he could have become “a body without organs.”[16]

While most of us live by the time of good sense, the Nietzschean subject is able to defy such sense and experience the creative evolution of self in exploration of a deeper memory – the virtual memory of the pure past as the event of events of the eternal return. Rather than a self-identical self, the self of the third synthesis of time is a creatively evolving self who is able to genuinely affirm life as metamorphosis.[17]

Leo chooses to become partially mad, for Mardou is the other half of his madness. The internal theatre of Leo stages a sexual intercourse between Mardou and Yuri and/but although this intercourse has not yet taken place, Leo is assured that one day it will. Leo had started plotting ways of getting rid of Mardou three weeks prior to their split. Is this will a will to end the relationship that makes Leo see this dream? In other words, is the source of this dream a will-to-nothingness-oriented-hope, a wish that Mardou will engage in sexual intercourse with Yuri and the relationship will end that way? Or is the dream based on a will-to-nothingness-oriented-fear that Mardou does not, and has never loved Leo? These questions can be asked if one wants to know what the dream means, in other words these questions are interpretation oriented questions and my aim here is not to interpret Leo’s dream and understand what it means but rather to make use of this dream in understanding why this dream matters not only for The Subterraneans, but also for twentieth century philosophy, literature, cultural and critical theory, and psychoanalysis.

 Both Oedipus and Leo see themselves as innocent victims “caught in a trap set by the God.” Fiction and reality give birth to one another in each case. In Oedipus’ case the prophecy turns into truth, in Leo’s case a dream turns into reality. Leo believes in what he sees in his dream and he sees Mardou in bed with Yuri. And his strong belief, almost an obsession, that one day Mardou will sleep with Yuri gives birth to the actualisation of this event at the end of the novel. Leo tells everyone about his dream. He tells Mardou almost every day following his dream that he is worried about the future of their relationship. Leo’s paranoid-schizoid attitude prepares the grounds for the actualization of what he was afraid of. At the end of the story, the only thing left at hand for Leo to make the best of is to write his experiences down and turn his loss into a gain in and through language. Leo is such a tragic character that in order to remain sane he has to laugh at himself by considering the “whole host and foolish illusion and entire rigmarole and madness we erect in the place of one love, in our sadness…”[18] to be a joke. When Leo learns that Mardou has actually slept with Yuri, when the truth is finally established, when fiction turns into reality, he addresses the reader:

[…]but I continue the daydream and I look into his eyes and I see suddenly the glare of a jester angel who made his presence on earth all a joke and I realize that this too with Mardou was a joke and I think, ‘Funny Angel, elevated amongst the subterraneans.’

‘Baby its up to you,’ is what she’s actually saying, ‘ about how many times you wanta see me and all that – but I want to be independent like I say.’

And I go home having lost her love.

And write this book.[19]

Kerouac writes through love, but through a love that Leo is afraid of falling in. And his writing is the product of a sick desire, it is driven by a love of love, a desire to be desired. Kerouac exposes himself through Leo in such a way as to show why it is necessary to create something without becoming destructive of either the self or the other. Something that he himself doesn’t know how to do. It is an ill will that drives Kerouac towards manic-depressive, self-destructive alcoholism. His consciousness of the absence of “eternal love” in this finite life together with his immortal longing for an eternal love turn him into “a shipwreck on the shores of lust.” What Kerouac lacks in life is what is necessary to operate the war-machine in Kerouac. Love is the force that drives the war-machine and Kerouac is afraid of loving with a greater love, without projective identification. He is a paranoid love-machine because his love is in the form of a spark given birth by the struggle between the superiority and the inferiority complexes he simultaneously harbors within himself.

In the absence of a war–machine, war dominates the world. And when war dominates the world there is nothing left for one to write but that although his books are among the most important examples of a different way of being in relation to time, language, and life, Kerouac is “locked into an attenuating endgame, playing himself, with each move, further into a corner and into defeat.”[20] He, suffering inordinately from an irrecoverable loss, an irreparable deterioration of psychic and somatic health, pays a high price to render us the witnesses of his fantastic experiences.

Kerouac died in 1969 and/but long ago, in 1951, eighteen years before ceasing to exist among the living, in On the Road, he writes this:

And for just a moment I had reached the point of ecstasy that I always wanted to reach, which was the complete step across chronological time into timeless shadows, and wonderment in the bleakness of the mortal realm, and the sensation of death kicking at my heels to move on, with a phantom dogging its own heels, and myself hurrying to a plank where all the angels dove off and flew into the holy void of uncreated emptiness, the potent and inconceivable radiances shining in bright Mind Essence, innumerable lotus-lands falling open in the magic mothswarm of heaven. I could hear an indescribable seething soar which wasn’t in my ear but everywhere and had nothing to do with sounds. I realized that I had died and been reborn numberless times but just didn’t remember especially because the transition from life to death and back to life are so ghostly easy, a magical action for naught, like falling asleep and waking up again a million times, the utter casualness and deep ignorance of it. I realized it was only because of the stability of the intrinsic mind that these ripples of birth and death took place, like that action of wind on a sheet of pure, serene, mirror-like water. I felt sweet, swinging bliss, like a big shot of heroin in the mainline vein; like a gulp of wine late in the afternoon and it makes you shudder; my feet tingled. I thought I was going to die the very next moment.[21]

What Kerouac enjoys is death from pleasure, what he desires is suffering. In Kerouac’s writing there is a multiplication of the directions towards which it becomes possible for the subject to head as the subject goes along the way creating new life forces out of his Dionysiac regress. In time, however, Kerouac’s revolutionary becoming takes such a direction that his desire turns against itself turning him into a reactive force drowning in his own resentment. The Kerouac image represented by the media (newspapers, TV, radio), is in conflict with Kerouac’s image of himself, and this relation to himself of Kerouac through a media, through an external force, through a panoptic eye, locks Kerouac into the projection-introjection mechanism through which he constantly breaks and is beaten by as he beats. This operation is more than Kerouac can actively handle, and turns him into a reactive and anti-social person making him “rather will nothingness than not will,” destroying him in the process.

 Conclusion of Part III

 In Julio Cortazar’s short story Axolot, we read the main character realizing that the type of fish called Axolot stand still in water with no movement at all, a kind of motionless flight. With this realization the character commits himself to becoming like those fish himself. At the end of the story he sees everyone outside of himself as an Axolot fish. He has become an axolot himself. He has gone beyond the finitude of his existence. He becomes altogether immobile, merely an observer, watching people, life, opportunities, and time pass by. Eventually he becomes imperceptible. Here and now everything is continually changing towards becoming-imperceptible. Time turns something into nothing. Everything is in time only for a short period of time. Then everything disappears in a neutral light.

To have dismantled one’s self in order finally to be alone and meet the true double at the other end of the line. A clandestine passenger on a motionless voyage. To become like everybody else; but this, precisely, is a becoming only for one who knows how to be nobody, to no longer be anybody. To paint oneself gray on gray.[22]

It is the ambiguity of the relationship between the life drive and the death drive that is being manipulated by global capitalism (contemporary nihilism) today. Undecidability, absence of foundational truth procedures, loss of principles, and declarations of the end of history and the subject are all manifestations of a discursive disease which is very rapidly contaminating the relationship between humans and their own health. In a world where a normal person must have a therapist, where having a therapist is a sign of normalcy, there can be no other choice but to shake the foundations of the illusions on which the health of many generations to come depends.

Carrying out an intervention in the course of events, introducing a split into the continuity of things requires learning how not to be produced by the image factory which captures desire in a certain order of signification mechanism so as to turn the subject into a copy of the products of the image factory, or into the object of the other’s interpretation  and identification processes. To become capable at least to subvert the codes of the capitalist axiomatics which produces desire as the desire of nothingness and death, this subject should come to a realization that he/she is already caught up in the projection-introjection mechanism. So the subject has to learn to use the projection-introjection mechanism in such a way as to sustain the conditions for the impossibility of wickedness in the form of exclusive and illusory constructions of the Real. Surviving the absence of a transcendental signified in a “time out of joint” requires learning to love the object of desire for what it is rather than for what it resembles. This is to love and live without projective identification, without paranoid reactions to the other, without possessing the other, or without confining the other within the boundaries of the self. One has to cease to be somebody and learn to become nobody so as to create a difference in and for itself and affirm this difference by affirming the difference of that which is “not I.”


[1] Jacques Derrida, Cogito and the History of Madness, from Writing and Difference,” trans. Alan Bass (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 76

[2] Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 264

[3] Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and The Literary Imagination (London: Yale University Press, 1975), 1

[4]Langer, 22

[5] D.M. Thomas, The White Hotel (London: Victor Gollancz, 1981), 6

[6] Thomas, 171

[7] Thomas, 171

[8] Carl G. Jung, Problems of Alchemy, “Selected Writings,” ed. Anthony Storr (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 270-1

[9] Thomas, 10

[10] Thomas, 239-40

[11] Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 9

[12] Jack Kerouac, The Subterraneans (Penguin: London, 2001), 69

[13] Kerouac, 93

[14] Kerouac, The Subterraneans (Penguin: London, 2001), 39

[15] Jack Kerouac, The Subterraneans (Penguin: London, 2001), 20

[16]Antonin Artaud, Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag (University of California: Berkeley, 1975), 570-1 “When you will have made him a body without organs,

then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom

then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out

as in the frenzy of dancehalls

and this wrong side out will be his real place.”

[17] Tamsin Lorraine, Living a Time Out of Joint, “Between Deleuze and Derrida,” eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi (Continuum: London and NY, 2003), 39

[18] Kerouac, 77

[19] Kerouac, 93

[20] J.M. Coetzee, Youth (Secker and Warburg: London, 2002), 169

[21] Jack Kerouac, On the Road (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), 173

[22] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (University of Minnesota Press: Minnesota, 1988), 197

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 Aslen Almanya doğumlu olmakla beraber çalışmalarının büyük bir kısmını İngiltere’de yalnızlık içerisinde sürdürmeyi seçen Melanie Klein çocuk psikanalizinin yaratıcısı ve en önemli kuramcısıdır. Freudcu psikanalizden radikal bir kopuş gerçekleştirerek anti-ortodoks, daha doğrusu a-ortodoks, yani durağanlık karşıtı, akışkanlık yanlısı bir duruşu benimseyen ve çocuk gelişimi ve pedagojisi üzerine yaşamı boyunca bıkmadan usanmadan araştırmalar yapan Klein’ın nesne-ilişkileri kuramı adıyla anılan teorileri lokâl olarak yurdumuzun, genel olarak ise dünyamızın mevcut durumu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda gittikçe artan bir öneme sahiptir.
Klein’a göre çocuk daha dili öğrenmeden büyüklerin algıladığından farklı da olsa çevresindeki dünya ile derin ve karmaşık bir ilişki içerisindedir. Klein’ın nesne ilişkileri adını verdiği bu ilişkiler çocuğun dünyayı algılama biçiminde ve buna bağlı gelişiminde fantazmatik üretim ve hayal kurma yetisi gibi bilinç oyunlarının oynadığı önemli rolün altını çizmiştir. Klein Çocukların Psikanalizi adlı ilk kitabında paranoid-şizoid pozisyon diye tanımladığı yaşamın ilk yıllarını analiz etmiş, bu evrenin yerini dili kullanma yetisinin edinilmesiyle birlikte depresif pozisyona bıraktığını yazmış ve buna bağlı olarak da fantezinin yerini alan düşüncenin çocuğun iyi ile kötü arasındaki ayrımı yapabilecek idrak kabiliyetine kavuşmasını sağladığını belirtmişti. Klein bir diğer önemli yapıtı olan Haset ve Şükran adlı kitabına ise kendisini çevreleyen hasetli ortamın yarattığı bunalımın damgasını vuracak ve öznenin oluşumunda nesne-ilişkilerinin ve çocuğu çevreleyen sevgi veya nefret yumağının önemini vurgulamakla psikanaliz alanında muazzam bir devrim yapacaktı.
Klein’a göre hepimiz yaşamlarımız boyunca paranoid-şizoid pozisyon ve depresif pozisyon arasında gidip geliriz. Yani aslında hiç kimse tamamen normal değildir ve olamaz da, çünkü dünya yapısı gereği normal bir yer değil, bilâkis son derece anormal hadiselerin cereyan ettiği bir yerdir. Bizler de dünyada yaşayan insanlar olduğumuza göre tüm bu anormalliklerden bağımsız bir biçimde normal insanlar olamayız. Normal olan tek şey normal diye bir şeyin olmadığıdır.Klein paranoid-şizoid ve depresif pozisyon kavramlarını yaratırken pozisyon kelimesini özellikle seçmiştir, zira bilmektedir ki bu pozisyonlar yaşamda birer ilerleme veya gerileme aşamasını ifade etmez. Bu ikisi daha ziyade arasında gidip geldiğimiz birer ruhsal durumdur. Diyalektik materyalizmi materyalist diyalektiğe dönüştürerek psikanalize uyarlamış bir insan olarak Klein’a göre paranoid-şizoid ve depresif pozisyonlar arasındaki gidip gelmeler bütünlüklerin statik yapısını bozmak ve statik olmayan akışkan bütünlükler oluşturmak arasındaki çalkantıları ifade eder. Eğer yaratıcılığın yaşamın anlamsız kaosundan bir bütünlük oluşturma eylemine verilen ad olduğunu akılda tutarsak Klein’ın teorilerinin içinde yaşadığımız koşullarla alakasını daha iyi idrak ederiz.
Klein yeni bir şey yaratma sürecinde bütünlükleri bozmanın en az onları oluşturmak kadar gerekli olduğunu düşünüyordu. Yani yıkıcı dürtülerin, veya Freud’un kavramını kullanacak olursak ölüm dürtüsünün egemen olduğu paranoid-şizoid pozisyonda çocuk saldırgan ve yıkıcı tavırlar takınırken—oyuncaklarını kırmaya meyilli çocukları hatırlayınız—depresif pozisyonda çocuk kendi oyuncaklarını kırıp dökmüş olduğu için oynayacak oyuncak bulamaz ve üzüntü duyar, canı sıkılır ve bu can sıkıntısı neticesinde de oyuncaklarını kırmaması gerektiğini anlar; yani olgunlaşır. İşte bu olgunlaşma sayesinde kırıp dökme eğilimi geride bırakılıp onarma ve tamir etme arzusu doğar.Klein’a göre olgunlaşma sürecinde vicdan azabı önemli bir rol oynar, ki benim Klein’dan ayrıldğım nokta da zaten budur. Ben şahsen çocuğun vicdan azabı duymasının olumlu bir sonuç vereceğini ve çocuğu büyümeye sevkedeceğini düşünmüyor, vicdan azabı duymaksızın da doğru ile yanlış arasındaki ayrımın yapılabileceğini iddia ediyorum. Klein’ın bu hatasının İsa’nın çarmıha gerilmesi neticesinde duyulan vicdan azabı üzerine kurulmuş bir din olan Hristiyanlık geleneği içerisinde yetişmiş bir kişi olmasından kaynaklandığı, ve dolayısıyla da Hristiyan olmayan toplumlar göz önünde bulundurululduğunda geçerliliğini yitireceği türünde sözler sarfedenler olmuştur. Bu saptamalar bir noktaya kadar doğru kabul edilebilir zira tutarlı ve Klein’la alaklıdırlar. Ama ben bunlara katılıp katılmamayı bir tarafa bırakıp işin özüne inmeyi seven bir insan olarak bu eleştirilerin tutarlılık ve hatta doğruluk ihtimallerine rağmen yüzeysel ve yetersiz olduğunu belirterek vicdan azabının hem manik depresyona hem de daha şiddetli bir biçimde şizofreniye has ve paranoya tarafından kışkırtılan bir ruhsal durum olarak sorunun kendisi olduğunu, dolayısıyla da sorunun çözümünde işe yaramayacağını düşünüyorum. Yani olayı Klein’ın kendisini içinde bulduğu ve yaşamı boyunca da dışına atmak için didinip durduğu dinsel bir düşünce sistemine bağlamak yerine şunu söylemeyi seçiyorum: Çocukların dünyasında vicdan azabı diye bir şey yoktur. Vicdan azabı şiddetine bağlı olarak yetişkin manik depresyona ve şizofreniye has bir ruhsal durumdur. Paranoyak şahsiyetler içlerindeki kötülüğü dışa yansıtıp dünyayı saplantılarının küçük anahtar deliğinden hasetle izlemekte bir sakınca görmemekle kalmazlar, aynı zamanda dış dünya karşısında saldırgan tavırlar takınarak kendilerini şiddetin ve nefretin kölesi kılmayı da marifet bellerler. Paranoyakların tam aksine şizoid şahsiyetler ise kendilerinin sorumlu olmadığı konularda bile aşırı derecede vicdan azabı duyar, vicdan azabına mıhlanmış acı dolu bir yaşam sürdürürler. Depresif pozisyonda ise şizofrenlere özgü şiddetli vicdan azabı ve paranoyaklara özgü ötekine hükmetme ve haketmediği bir biçimde suçlu muamelesi yapma eğilimleri bir nebze olsun ortadan kalkar ve kişi mutsuz bilinciyle gerçeklerle yüzleşir. Yersiz vicdan azabı hisleri tamamen ortadan kalkmamıştır belki manik depresif şahsiyette ve/fakat en azından başa çıkılabilir bir düzeye inmiş, gerçeklikle bağlantıyı tamamen yok edecek ve dış dünyayla ilişki kurmayı imkansız hale getirecek boyutlarda seyretmemektedir artık. Yani kişi iyi ile kötünün içiçe olduğunu anlar ve bir şeyin iyiliğiyle kötülüğünü o şeyin içinde bulunduğu durumun belirlediğini idrak eder. Demek ki Klein’ın o noktada İsa’nın çarmıha gerilmesiyle duyulan vicdan azabı üzerine kurulan Hristiyanlığı bir gelişme olarak görmüş olması ve bu vesileyle de vicdan azabının olgunlaşmaya katkılarından söz etmekte bir sakınca görmemiş olmasının doğru olma ihtimali olsa bile bu volontarist ve indirgemeci bir değerlendirmedir ve Klein’ın konuyu bu derece indirgemeci bir temel üzerine inşa etmiş olduğu saptamasına varmak konuyu saptırmaktır. Bu tür yaklaşımların ise kimseye hizmet etmeyeceği, aksine insanlığı Klein gibi iyi niyetli bir insanın teorilerinden mahrum bırakarak insanlığın geleceğine zarar verme gayesi güttüğü aşikardır. Zira çocuğun aynı nesnenin aynı anda ve/fakat işte duruma göre hem iyi hem de kötü nesne olarak algılamasının, çocuğun iyi ile kötü arasında ayrım yapabilecek yetkinliğe ulaşmışlığının göstergesi olduğunu bizzat Klein’ın kendisi söylemiştir, ki sanırım bu da Klein’ın kendisine yöneltilen eleştirileri peşinen çökerttiğinin göstergesidir.Bence Klein içim mühim olan yapılan hatalardan olumlu sonuçlar çıkarabilmek ve hastayı olumlayıcı dönüşümlere tabi kılmaktır. Çünkü görüyoruz ki Klein’ın teorisi nefret üzerine değil, sevgi üzerine, olumsuzlama üzerine değil, olumlayıcılık üzerine kurulmuştur. Ama bununla beraber Klein’ın sevgiye giden yolda düşe kalka ilerleyen bir insanın, özellikle de bir çocuğun, işlemediği bir suçtan, büyüklerin aklı ile düşünülünce işlemiş gibi görünebileceği bir suçtan ötürü vicdan azabı duyması gerektiği yönündeki saptaması kendi teorisinin özüne ters düşmektedir. Zira büyüklerin dünyasında, yaptığı her hareketin suç sayıldığı bir dünyada çocuğun bu vicdan azabını duyabileceği pek de ikna edici değildir. Klein’a katılmadığım nokta işte budur: Bence özne suçlu doğmaz ama suç işlemek zorunda bırakılarak büyür. Ama bununla beraber şunu da söylemeliyim ki Klein’ın teorisi oldukça pratik ve kullanışlıdır everensel bir eleştirel teorinin gelişimi için, tabii eğer hataları olumlayıcı bir biçimde dönüştürüp geçmişten ders almayı öğrene ve öğrete/bilirsek.
Nitekim aslen Cezayir kökenli bir Yahudi olan ünlü Fransız düşünürü Jacques Derrida, metin analizleri esnasında suç işlemeyi olumlu bir şey olarak görür. İşe suç denilen şeyin önceden belirlenip özneye empoze edilen değerler ve kanunların bir ürünü olduğundan hareketle başlayan Derrida edebi yazarlarla eleştirel yazarlar arasında bir ayrım yapmaz ve ikisinin de yaratıcılıkla yokediciliğin içiçeliğinin bir sonucu olduğunu defalarca vurgular. Kendisine bu yüzden çok saldırılmıştır iki kesim tarafından da. Yaratıcı yazarlar işte Klein’ın an önce sözünü ettiğim o paranoid-şizoid ve depresif pozisyonlar arasında gidip gelen kişilerdir. Yaratıcılık, olanı, yani elde olan başka kitapları okuyarak, hatta yanlış okuyarak anlamını bozmayı ve daha sonra da bu yapısı bozulmuş anlamı yeniden kurarak ilerleme kaydedilmesini sağlar. Yani yaratıcılık yıkıcılığı içinde barındıran bir şeydir. Belki bir şey yapmak için başka bir şey yıkmak gerekmeyebilir, evet, ama eski bir şeyi yıkmış bulunmak yeni bir şey yaratmış olmanın bir sonucudur genelde.Derrida’nın deconstruction diye tabir ettiği ve anlamını tam yansıtmasa da Türkçe’ye yapıbozumculuk olarak çevrilmiş bulunan okuma tekniği aslında bir yazılmış olanı bozup yeniden yazma tekniğidir. Derrida metnin önce bildik, herkesçe kabul edildiği varsayılan anlamını gözler önüne serer, hemen akabinde ise bu egemen anlamın kendi içinde barındırdığı göz ardı edilmiş veya bilerek görmezlikten gelinmiş öteki-anlamlarını deşifre ederek mutlak anlamın kendi kendisini çökerten bir şey olduğunu gözler önüne serer. Derrida dil oyunları vasıtasıyla mutlak anlam denilen şeyin belirlenemezliğini ve ne denli kendi kendisiyle çelişen bir kavram olduğunu vurgular. Görüldüğü gibi Derrida’nın yaptığı aslında Klein’ın depresif pozisyonundan paranoid-şizoid pozisyona dönmek ve bu vesileyle de paranoid-şizoid pozisyona has bölme, parçalara ayırma, kırıp dökme eğilimini metin okumalarına uyarlamaktır. Bunu yapmakla aslında Derrida depresif pozisyonun varolabilmesi için paranoid-şizoid pozisyonu da kendi içinde barındırabilmesi gerektiğini gösterir. Derrida metnin kendi içinde bölünmüş olduğunu göstererek metni yeniden kurmuş olur ve böylelikle de mevcut ve alışılagelmiş bütünlüğün yapısını bozar. Bu yapıbozma, yani metni kendi içinde bölme ve parçalama işlemiyle biz okuyucular anlarız ki yaratıcılık ve yokedicilik, iyilik ve kötülük, çocukluk ve yetişkinlik, akıllılık ve akılsızlık, ilerleme ve gerileme, geçmiş ve gelecek, ve hatta ölüm ve yaşam içiçedir ve bütünlük denilen şey aslında bir yanılsmadan ibarettir. Zira parçalanmışlık bütünlüğün koşuludur. Ve her yetişkinin içinde bir çocuk ve her çocuğun içinde de dışarı çıkmayı bekleyen bir yetişkin vardır. Tıpkı bazı iyiliklerin içlerinde kötülüğü ve bazı kötülüklerin de içlerinde iyiliği barındırdığı gibi… (Demek ki Hegel haklıymış ve diyalektik materyalizm denilen şey dünyayı anlamak ve anlamlandırmak için gerçekten de son derece faydalı bir aygıtmış. Ama Marx, Hegel’den daha haklıymış çünkü Marx dünyayı anlamanın yetmediğini, anlama işlemini takiben dünyayı değiştirmek gerektiğini söylemiş Felsefi El Yazmaları adlı kitabında.)
Egemen anlamlandırma biçiminin yapısıdır aslında bozulan ve Derrida bozduğu bu yapının yerine yenisini koymanın anlamsız bir çaba olacağını düşündüğü içindir ki pek çokları tarafından nihilist ilan edilmiştir. Oysa Derrida’nın yaptığı aslında yapıyı bozmak değil yapının zaten bozuk olduğunu ve onarılması için de yeniden bozulması gerektiğini göstermektir. Yani Derrida bozukluğun kendisini bozmak suretiyle egemen çarpıklığı düzeltmeye çalışmaktadır. Derrida’nın tersine çevrilmiş ve ucu açık diyalektiğinin yaptığı aslında mutlak bütünlüğün zaten mümkün olmadığını göstermek ve bu vesileyle de hiçliğin yüceltimesi anlamına gelen nihlizmin büyük bir saçmalıktan başka bir şey olmadığının altını ve üstünü aynı anda çizmektir. Tüm bunların ışığında diyebiliriz ki Derrida’nın nihilist olarak nitelendirilmesi hem kaygı verici hem de sevindiricidir.Derrida ve Klein tüm yaşamlarını tüm insanlara yanlış yazılmış metinleri doğru okumayı ve doğru yazıldığını iddia edenlerini de yanlış yazmayı öğretmeye adamış birer eğitimci olarak hepimize kendimizden bile daha yakın, sorunlarımız üzerinde bizden çok düşünmüş ve bize gerek politik, gerek a-politik, gerekse anti-politik liderlerimizden çok daha faydalı olabilecek kişilerdir diye düşünüyorum. Zira hepimiz bir zamanlar çocuktuk ve şiddetin, savaşın ve ölümün hüküm sürdüğü büyüklerin dünyasında daha başka dünyalar yaratabilmek için biraz küçülmekte, veya en azından yaşlanmayı biraz ertelemekte, bırakın kötülük ve zarar olmasını, sanırım ki iyilik ve fayda vardır…
 
Çok önemli, en az üstteki yazı kadar, hatta belki de üst-yazıdan daha önemli dip-not: Burada Jacques Derrida ve Melanie Klein’ı sadece birer örnek olarak kullanıyorum. Onlar gibi daha pek çok “yabancı,” yani yaban ellerde doğup daha yaban ellerde büyümüş yazar mevcuttur bize bizden daha faydalı olabilecek. Altını çizmek istediğim konu odur bu kısa notla. Amacım kendimi kendimden çok az şey, neredeyse hiçbir şey kalacak kadar küçülterek kısmen yok ederken Klein ve Derrida’yı öne çıkarıp olduklarından belki biraz daha büyük göstermek, böylelikle de insanımız için önemlerinin üstünü değil, altını çizmektir sevgili okur; çok değil ama, birazcık…
(c) cengizerdem, 23 Nisan 2007, afrikapazar.
Korkunç canavaraların istilâsı altındaki paranoyak dünyaya has en ayırdedici özelliklerden biri de iç düşmanların dışa yansıtılarak benliğin sürekli tehdit altında olduğu saplantısıdır. Ne yazık ki politikacıların büyük bir kısmı genellikle paranoyayı bir yaşam biçimi haline getirme bu yaşam biçimini kitleye empoze etme eğilimindedirler. Paranoyak şahsiyet korkunç canavarlar tarafından istila edilmiş olsa da kendi iç dünyasını çok daha korkunç olduğunu düşündüğü gerçek dünyaya tercih eder ve kendisini işte bu iç dünyasına hapsederek dış dünyaya karşı geliştirdiği bir savunma mekanizmasının kölesi olur. Yani iç dünyasında olup bitenleri dış dünyada oluyormuş gibi görür ve dolayısıyla da saldırganlaşır. İşin aslını farkederse şiddeti kendisine yöneltir ve Hitler gibi intihar eder. Paranoyak şahsiyet kendisini o kadar örselenmiş ve kırılgan hisseder ki kendi yarattığı ve normal bir insanın en korkunç kabuslarından bile daha korkunç olan bir iç dünyada acıya, eleme, ızdıraba mahkum bir yaşam sürdürür. İşte bu nedenledir ki ötekilerin mutluluğunu hasetle kıskanır ve şiddete yönelir. Ötekileri acıya mıhlamak suretiyle kendi rezil ve iğrenç dünyasından kaçabileceğini sanır. Ne var ki bu boş bir çabadır, ve neticede pranoyak insan kendi dışkısında boğulur ölür.Paranoyak bir insan düşünelim, mesela adı Zihni olsun. Zihni haftada bir ruh doktoruna gidiyor olsun. Terapi senaslarını izleyen bir haftalık ayrılık sürecinde Zihni terapi seansı esnasında ruh doktoruyla yaptığı konuşmaların sürdüğünü düşünüyor olmakla kalmasın, aynı zamanda ertesi haftaki seansta konuşmayı kendi aklında bir hafta boyunca sürdürüp bi rsonraki seansta ruh doktoruyla konuşmaya kendi aklında kaldığı yerden devam ediyor olsun. Ruh doktoru önceleri Zihni’nin neden bahsettiğini anlamakta güçlük çeksin. Kendisini böyle bir durumda bulan ruh doktoru ne zaman ki Zihni’nin içsel diyaloğunu, yani aslında monoloğunu dışa yansıttığını idrak eder, işte o zaman Zihni’ye nasıl yaklaşıp ona içsel diyaloglarının gerçekdışılığını nasıl anlatması gerektiğini de keşfeder. Ruh doktoru Zihni’nin aklından geçeneleri hayal etmek durumdadır, ki bu da onu Zihni karşısında Zihni’ninkine benzer bir konuma yerleştirir. Aslında Zihni’nin sorunu ruh doktorunun sorunundan pek de farklı değildir ki bu ortak sorun şudur sevgili okur: Zihni ve ruh doktoru diyaloğu sürdürüp hayatta kalabilmek için karşılarındakinin düşüncelerini ve fantazilerini hayal etmek durumundadırlar. Zihni ve ruh doktoru kendi gerçekliklerini karşılarındakinin gerçekliğinden ayırmak zorunda olduklarını idrak etmeleri gerektiğini anladıkları zaman tedavi süreci yarı yarıya tamamlanmış sayılır. Bu sürecin tam başarıyla sonuçlandırılması içinse “ben” ve “öteki” arasındaki düşmanlığın yerini bir boşluğun alması gerekir, ki bu boşluk aynı zamanda onların birbirlerine olan saygı ve sevgilerinin ortaya çıkması için gereken bir koşuldur.Paranoyak dünyada iç ve dış dünya arasındaki boşluk ortadan kalkmakla kalmamış, araya düşmanlık girmiştir. Paranoyak düşünce dış dünyada gerçekleşen her şeyi kendi kendisini besleyecek şekilde yorumlar. Dış dünyada ne olursa olsun paranoyak zihniyet bunu kendi düş aleminin küçük penceresinden görüp indirgemeci(Hitler), volontarist(Mao), ve hatta determinist(Stalin) tavırlar takınır düşman bellediği dış gerçekliğe karşı. (Ama belirtmeliyim ki bu üçü aslında birbirleriyle içiçedir ve her biri ötekileri de bünyesinde barındırır, üçünün de kökeninde paranoya vardır.)Paranoyak şahsiyet kafasında yarattığı sanal gerçekliği sürekli canlı tutmak için ne sebepsiz şiddetten kaçınır ne de kendi gerçekliğini zorla ötekilere empoze etmekten. Paranoyak dünyanın çöküşü nefret edilen şeyin aslında dışsal değil içsel olduğunun keşfini hem beraberinde getirir hem de bu keşfin neticesidir. Irkçı, faşist, ve totaliter düşünce sistemleri bu duruma en güzel örneği teşkil ederler.Theodor Adorno Freud’cu Teori ve Faşist Propagandanın İzleği adlı makalesinde bu konuya değiniyor. Adorno’ya göre faşist şahsiyet ve yandaşları aslında Yahudi’nin şeytan olduğuna yürekten inanmazlar. Onların ideolojisi sadece kafalarında yarattıkları paranoyak gerçekliği diri tutmak için kendi şeytanlıklarını Yahudi’nin üzerine yansıtmaktan ibarettir. “Faşist toplulukları bu kadar acımasız ve yaklaşılmaz kılan belki de kendi gerçekliklerinin kurmaca olduğundan duydukları şüphedir. Éğer bir an durup düşünecek olsalar,” diyor Adorno, “tüm performans yerle bir olacak, kendi ideolojileri üzerlerine çökecek, ve panik halinde kendi kendilerine saldıracaklardır.”[4]Demek ki paranoyak zihniyet yapısı gereği akılcı düşünceyi dışlamak zorundadır varlığını sürdürebilmek için. Paranoyak, akılcı düşüncenin yerine kendi fantazilerini yerleştirir. Bunu 11 Eylül sonrası psikopatlaşan Batı’nın siyasi liderlerinin söylemlerinde de gözlemleyebiliriz. Özellikle Bush ve yandaşları hemen hemen her konuşmalarında kendileri ve ötekiler arasına barışın sağlanması için değil, savaşın ve şiddetin muhafazasına yönelik kesin çizgiler çekmekte, barikatlar kurmakta, adaları içinde işkencenin rutin hale geldiği hapishanelere dönüştürmekte, sağa sola duvarlar inşa etmektedirler. Demektedirler ki “Biz adaletin savunucularıyız, dolayısıyla iyiyiz. Onlar bize karşı, dolayısıyla onlar kötü.” Oysa artık bilmeyen kalmadı Bush rejiminin en az köktendinci teröristler kadar saldırgan ve düşüncesiz, yani psikopat olabileceğini ve ötekini yok edip kendi canına can katmak için kendi insanı dahil tüm dünya insanlarını tehlikeye atıp şeytanın merhametinden medet ummayı marifet bellediğini…Not: Bu yazı artık hepimizin bildiği bariz gerçekleri dile getiriyor, pek de öyle yeni bir şey söylemiyor olabilir ve/fakat bu onun önemsiz ve gereksiz olduğu anlamına gelmemelidir. Önemi psikanalitik söylemi siyasete uygulamasından, literatürümüze yeni terimler katmasından, özellikle de totaliter ve faşist zihniyetlerin iç dinamiklerini anlamakta ve eleştirmekte psikanailzin nasıl kullanılabileceğini göstermesinden ileri gelir. Emsâl teşkil etsin diye yazılmıştır sevgili okur.
 
Sözlük
Paranoya: Yunanca’dan gelir ve özünde aklını yitirmiş olmak, kendi dışında olmak, ne yaptığını bilmemek anlamına falan gelir.
Politika: Gene Yunan kökenli bir sözcüktür, kent anlamını taşıyan Polis’ten gelir. Kelimenin Polemos’la alakalı olduğuve özünde çatışma, bölünme, hatta savaş anlamını taşıdığı söylenir. Bir diğer anlamı da “çok yüzlülük”tür.
Volontarizm: Gerçeği zorla değiştirme çabası.
Determinizm: İç gerçekliği dıştan belirleme, dış gerçekliği iç gerçeklikmiş gibi görme ve gösterme çabası.
İndirgemecilik(Reductionism): Kendi dışındaki gerçekliği şeytan ilan etme, kendini melek ilan etme saplantısı. Hayatı mekanistik bir dualizme indirgeme ve bu suretle yaşamı olanaklarını kıstlayıp çoğulculuğu katletme eğilimidir.
 
(c) cengizerdem, afrikagazetesi, 2007.